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INTRODUCTION 
Not all wars involve heavy munitions. Some wars are fought with court filings. 
The smartphone patent wars are being fought to see who will dominate an 
increasingly valuable market. According to a study by Nielsen in the summer of 
2012, over 55% of mobile subscribers in the United States own smartphones.1 And 
the demographic that is acquiring smartphones keeps getting younger. Nielsen further 
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 1. Young Adults and Teens Lead Growth Among Smartphone Owners, NIELSEN 
NEWSWIRE (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2012/young-adults
-and-teens-lead-growth-among-smartphone-owners.html. 
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indicates that 74% of young adults between twenty-five and thirty-four years old own 
a smartphone, and 58% of American teenagers between the ages of thirteen and 
seventeen own a smartphone.2 This is a battle for profits, but more than that, this is a 
battle for long-term customers who are starting to use sophisticated technologies at 
younger and younger ages.  
But the current patent war is also broader than smartphones. The year 2012 saw a 
number of new developments in patent litigation over smartphones and related 
technologies. This includes disputes over the 802.11 wireless standards, or Wi-Fi,3 
without which many smartphones would just be phones and many modern homes 
would have CAT 5 cables snaking from room to room to allow gaming consoles, 
laptops, and other devices to share the same network connection. These are not 
patents on technologies that only a small subset of the population uses. These patents 
involve everyday technologies that many of us take for granted, from smartphones to 
video game consoles to streaming videos. 
Patent litigation in this area has been making headlines, in part because some of 
these cases are between two parties that are already household names. In August 
2012, Apple successfully obtained a jury award against Samsung in excess of $1 
billion, but the court subsequently reduced the damages award by over $450 million.4 
In November 2012, Nokia began filing in courts around the world to enforce a 
Swedish arbitration decision declaring that Research In Motion, the maker of 
Blackberry smartphones, must reach a new licensing agreement with Nokia for 
wireless technology patents or else stop selling Blackberry products that use Wi-Fi.5 
In May 2012, a German court granted Motorola’s request for an injunction against 
Microsoft over the latter’s use of patented technologies relating to the H.264 video 
encoding standard and the 802.11 wireless standard6—but in the United States in 
September 2012, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the injunction was not self-enforcing.7 
And these are just three examples of disputes between large companies that actually 
practice the patents in issue. A discussion of patent assertion entities (PAE),8 which 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Univ. of Miami Leonard M. Miller Sch. of Med., Wi-Fi/802.11 Standards, 
MIAMI.EDU, http://it.med.miami.edu/x275.xml.  
 4. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2013 WL 772525, at 
*1, *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2013).  
 5. See Eingestellt von Florian Mueller, RIM Loses Arbitration, Has to Agree with 
Nokia on Royalties or Stop Selling WiFi Products, FOSS PATENTS (Nov. 28, 2012, 11:07 
AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/11/rim-loses-arbitration-has-to-agree-with.html. 
 6. Gen. Instrument Corp. v. Microsoft Deutschland GmbH, Landgericht Mannheim 
[LG] [Regional Court of Mannheim] May 2, 2012, (Ger.), available at http://
www.scribd.com/doc/94523005/Translation-of-Mannheim-2O240-Ruling-Motorola-v
-Microsoft; INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, H.264: ADVANCED VIDEO CODING FOR GENERIC 
AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES (2013), available at http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-H.264. 
 7. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). The injunction 
would have prohibited Microsoft from selling the Xbox 360 or any product incorporating 
Windows 7 or Windows Media Player 12.  
 8. The label “PAE” was promoted by the FTC in its 2011 report to distinguish a 
specific type of non-practicing entity (NPE). FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: 
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 n.5 (2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf. 
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are often referred to disparagingly as “patent trolls,” is outside the scope of this 
Article, but they too have sought hundreds of millions of dollars in royalties from 
the deep pockets of technology giants.9 
This Article focuses on disputes concerning patents that are essential to 
technology standards. During the creation of a standard, the standard-setting 
organization (SSO) will typically require members who hold standard essential 
patents (SEPs) to make a commitment to license these patents on fair, reasonable, 
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.10 However, the legal effect of this 
FRAND commitment is sometimes unclear, and this lack of clarity is especially 
problematic when the dispute is international in nature because jurisdictions may 
view these commitments very differently. U.S. courts, for example, may be more 
willing to recognize third-party beneficiary rights in the FRAND contract than 
some European jurisdictions.11 U.S. courts may also apply the equitable test of 
eBay v. MercExchange12 to foreclose injunctions when the infringed patent is an 
SEP.13 On the other hand, U.S. courts are less likely to apply antitrust law to 
foreclose anticompetitive use of SEPs than European courts.14 
With this Article, we aim to reframe the discussion of FRAND commitments in 
a way that will be beneficial to the many participants affected by disparate 
treatment of licensing commitments made in the standard-setting context. The 
conceptual framework we propose characterizes FRAND commitments as creating 
a property interest, instead of merely creating a contract or a condition that affects a 
competitive relation. To address the question of remedies, we apply this theory to 
support a contention that injunctions against the use of SEPs would be adverse to 
the public interest. 
As discussed in Part II, FRAND commitments are awash in case law and court 
decisions but are bereft of a discussion of their theoretical underpinnings. This 
Article fills that void by developing a conceptual framework for understanding 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See, e.g., VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:10-CV-417, 2013 WL 692652 (E.D. Tex. 
Feb. 26, 2013); MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 508 (D. Del. 2012); 
Charles Arthur, VirnetX Adds iPhone 5 to New Apple Lawsuit After $368m Trial Win, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2012, 1:21 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/nov/09
/apple-virnetx-patent-iphone-5 (noting ongoing litigation); Christina Bonnington, Jurors Say 
Apple iPhone Infringes on Three MobileMedia Patents, WIRED (Dec. 13, 2012, 3:23 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/12/iphone-infringes-patent/ (quoting Florian Mueller 
for the premise that MobileMedia is a patent licensing and assertion entity, though it 
undertakes its activities on behalf of Sony, Nokia, and MPEG-LA). On VirnetX’s website, 
the company explicitly states that their “portfolio of intellectual property is the foundation of 
[their] business model.” Gabriel Patent Licensing, VIRNETX, http://virnetx.com
/licensing/patent-licensing-2/. Thus, it is probably not unreasonable to categorize VirnetX as 
a patent assertion entity.  
 10. Because we frequently use acronyms in this Article, we have included a Glossary in 
the Appendix. 
 11. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 888 (“German courts, unlike some U.S. courts and 
commentators, do not interpret the RAND commitment to create a contract enforceable by 
third parties or to foreclose injunctive relief.”). 
 12. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 13. See Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 877. 
 14. See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
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FRAND commitments using property theory. This Article focuses on FRAND 
commitments and five problems arising repeatedly with respect to these 
agreements: (1) whether the FRAND obligation transfers to subsequent assignees 
of the patent; (2) whether FRAND commitments should apply to patents acquired 
after making the FRAND commitment (i.e., after-acquired patents); (3) whether 
nonmembers of the SSO should have the same standing as SSO members to 
enforce FRAND commitments; (4) how to understand the word “essential” in the 
phrase “standard essential patents” (SEPs); and (5) whether the FRAND 
commitment should impact remedies available in patent litigation, either from the 
perspective of the patent owner or the beneficiary of the FRAND commitment.  
Different types of analysis were required for each of these five problems. For 
the nonmember and after-acquired problems, resolution could be reached largely 
through analysis of accepted legal approaches. To understand essentiality, we 
evaluated the problem from a more practice-based approach, relying on 
representations by industry representatives with whom we consulted. Our analysis 
of the issues relating to remedies shifted more toward the theoretical, with 
emphasis on the well-established approach of Calabresi and Melamed to property 
and liability rules, while applying the current law pertaining to injunctions in patent 
litigation. We found, however, that the currently applied legal theories are 
insufficient to support the transferability of FRAND commitments, and that in fact 
some existing case law suggests that a property theory offers a better vehicle for 
transferability. To our knowledge, this Article represents the first attempt at 
applying U.S.-based property law and theory to the issue of FRAND commitment 
transferability. As discussed in Part III, our property approach begins with the 
theoretical foundations provided by Hohfeldian analysis of jural relations, before 
narrowing the focus to a more specific analogy to the law of servitudes. 
This Article is organized as follows. In Part I, we introduce some of the major 
issues that arise in the context of interoperability and standards, with a focus on the 
presence of FRAND commitments.15 This Part includes a detailed hypothetical to 
illustrate what we view as some of the most significant potential issues. In Part II, 
we analyze how the law may apply to FRAND commitments under several 
different theories, how some of these issues have been treated by courts thus far, 
and how current theories apply to the problems raised in our hypothetical. In Part 
III, we expound on a new theory that FRAND commitments can be viewed as 
creating an interest analogous to a servitude in real property. In Part IV, we 
examine the issue of whether the owners of SEPs should be able to obtain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. In the United States, these terms are sometimes referred to as “reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory,” or RAND. Judge Posner wrote recently that “the word ‘fair’ adds 
nothing to ‘reasonable’ and ‘nondiscriminatory.’” Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 
2d 901, 911–12 (N.D. Ill. 2012). However, because “FRAND” is often used to describe these 
terms in the United States anyway, and it is how these terms are typically described in 
analysis elsewhere (including Europe), we use the term FRAND in this report instead of 
RAND to better encompass the international scope of the discussion. Adopting the acronym 
“FRAND” might also simplify searches for relevant information, as fewer words in the 
English language contain the consecutive letters F-R-A-N-D than contain the consecutive 
letters R-A-N-D. 
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injunctions against the implementers of standards for which the SEP owners made 
FRAND commitments.  
I. PATENTS, ESSENTIALITY, STANDARDS, AND SSO POLICIES 
A. Patents and Innovation 
There is much criticism of patent litigation and the potential effects it can have 
on innovators. Some claim that patent litigation may have the effect of stifling 
innovation,16 but David Kappos, the former director of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), stated recently that the smartphone patent wars are 
themselves a sign that the U.S. patent system works to promote innovation.17  
Regardless of which side has a more persuasive argument, the interplay between 
law, technology, and society is abundantly clear. This is a high technology world, 
shaped by computing, networking, and communications technologies. Many of 
these technologies are protected by the intellectual property laws of the United 
States. Congress’s authority to regulate patents stems from the Constitution, which 
empowers Congress to enact laws to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”18 Thousands of innovations over the last half century have come together to 
shape modern computing. Supporters of modern intellectual property law attribute 
many of these innovations to the protections afforded inventors under patent law.19  
Inventors who successfully obtain a patent are granted a legal monopoly for the 
life of the patent, which is currently twenty years from the date of first submission 
of the application.20 During this patent period, the inventor who retains ownership 
of the patent can recoup her investment, with three main options available to do so: 
by being the only person allowed to practice the patent, by licensing the patent to 
others and collecting royalties, or by practicing the patent and granting licenses 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars
-among-tech-giants-can-stifle-competition.html. 
 17. Steve Lohr, Smartphone Patent Wars Show the System Works, Patent Chief Says, 
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 20, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/20
/smartphone-patent-wars-show-the-system-works-patent-chief-says. For more discussions 
about the possible effects of patents and patent litigation on innovation, see Michael A. 
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO 
GENETIC TESTS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH, 
AND SOCIETY (2010), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/SACGHS
_patents_report_2010.pdf (“The Committee also found that patents have been used to narrow 
or clear the market of existing tests, thereby limiting, rather than promoting availability of 
testing.”). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 19. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1892 (2002) (referencing and contesting the standard 
economic theory of IP rights, which argues that weaker IP rights will result in decreased 
innovation). 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
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simultaneously. Hovenkamp notes that organizations may also obtain patents for 
defensive motives, such as allowing the organization to practice inventions in a 
way that minimizes the threat of patent litigation.21 
Modern innovation typically builds on earlier innovation, in a way that 
Professor Carl Shapiro likens to standing atop a pyramid rather than, as Newton 
originally described the progress of science, standing “on the shoulders of giants.”22 
The pyramid metaphor communicates that often, one innovation relies on many 
earlier innovations, which each in turn rely on even earlier innovations. It logically 
follows that many modern inventions may rely to some extent on technologies that 
are still covered by patents held by others.23 Some scholarship indicates that in 
areas where innovation is cumulative—that is, more like the pyramid metaphor—
strong intellectual property (IP) rights can impede innovation.24  
In this IP-centric context, patent litigation typically follows a fairly predictable 
pattern. A patent holder may notify the alleged infringer that a particular product 
infringes on his technology and demand royalties. The patent holder may then file 
suit against the alleged infringer if the parties are unable to reach an agreement. 
The patent holder’s goal in an infringement action may be damages, often in the 
form of court-ordered royalty payments, or an injunction to prevent the defendant 
from practicing the patent holder’s invention.25 Professor Golden notes that 
historically, if the patent holder thought he could obtain an injunction, the patent 
holder might also use the potential injunction as leverage to obtain a settlement for 
a higher royalty payment than the alleged infringer would have been willing to pay 
otherwise.26 The alleged infringer is likely to defend by arguing either that the 
asserted patent was invalid, or that if it was valid, there was no infringement.27 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1119, 1137 (2012). 
 22. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119–20 (Adam B. Jaffe, 
Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters
/c10778.pdf; see also Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of 
Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 752 
(2007) (“[T]he cumulative nature of innovation means that almost all innovations are linked 
to other innovations to some degree.”). 
 23. See Adam Speegle, Note, Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse of the 
Standard-Setting Process, 110 MICH. L. REV. 847, 848 (2012) (noting that the majority of 
consumer electronics are “aggregations of independent patented technologies that are 
packaged together”). 
 24. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1948 (referencing economic scholarship); see also 
Menell, supra note 22, at 753 (“[T]he trend of digital technology toward greater 
collaborative creativity and costly enforcement seems unlikely to support traditional 
conceptions of ownership and control.”). 
 25. See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 514 
(2010).  
 26. See id. at 508. 
 27. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (listing available defenses to assertions of patent 
infringement). 
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B. Interoperability and Standards 
These patterns of arguments regarding patent infringement and validity also 
arise in the context of standardized technologies. When this happens, the impact is 
potentially much broader. James Surowiecki of Wired asserted in 2002 that 
“without standardization there wouldn’t be a modern economy.”28 While this 
statement was put forth largely with mass production and mass communication in 
mind, it is similarly true for the modern computing industry.  
The complications arising from the aggregate nature of innovation are 
compounded by the modern need for technologies—especially communication 
technologies—to be interoperable. The ability of gadgets to interact with each other 
is of paramount importance in this age in which information is exchanged across 
thousands of miles in a matter of seconds.29 Device interoperability gives 
consumers more options in how they use technologies. Interoperability also 
increases network effects—that is, the positive effects that emerge as more people 
adopt the technology.30 Network effects are especially prevalent in the Internet, 
computer, and telecommunications (ICT) industries. This is partly because the cost 
of creating the technology decreases as more users adopt the technology and partly 
because, as Merges and Kuhn observe, innovations in these industries are the most 
effective when large numbers of people adopt them, and one way to encourage 
wide adoption is to standardize the technology.31  
In the ICT industries, the establishment of standards is important for the twin 
goals of achieving higher levels of interoperability and obtaining greater network 
effects. Sometimes, an industry may establish de facto standards through wide 
usage,32 but other times, standard-setting organizations (SSOs) formally establish 
standards through detailed processes.33 SSOs are generally voluntary collectives in 
which representatives from multiple private companies, who are often competitors 
of each other, work together to establish technology standards.34 Speegle notes that 
consumers and industry both benefit from an efficient use of the standard-setting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. James Surowiecki, Turn of the Century, WIRED, Jan. 2002, at 85, available at http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.01/standards.html. 
 29. See Stacy Baird, The Government at the Standards Bazaar, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 35, 38 (2007) (emphasizing the importance of interoperability in information 
technology). 
 30. Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (“Standardization spurs network effects because a program 
that interoperates with a variety of programs and files is more valuable than one that works 
only in isolation.”). 
 31. See id. at 5 (stating that in the case of “network goods” like software, a product 
becomes more valuable when more people use it); id. at 7 (stating that standardization allows 
for greater interoperability between different software components). 
 32. The Blu-ray/HD DVD conflict is an example of a “standard war” in a de facto 
standard-setting context. In lieu of a separate organization determining the final 
specifications, the winner of the standard war was determined by the market. Speegle, supra 
note 23, at 848. 
 33. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1898–99. 
 34. See id. at 1947 (noting that SSOs “are built on agreements among horizontal 
competitors”). 
238 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:231 
 
process because the resulting technologies are more interoperable and are more 
quickly adopted by consumers.35 
Because of the aggregate nature of innovation and the prevalence of patents in 
the ICT industries, many standards set by SSOs implicate proprietary technologies 
that are still covered by patents. This increases the possibility of abuse, either 
through patent ambush or patent holdup. Patent ambush in the standards context 
might arise where a patent holder learns that a proposed standard implicates claims 
covered by his patent or patent application but does nothing either to inform the 
SSO or to assert his rights until after the standard has been adopted.36 On the other 
hand, Merges and Kuhn describe patent holdup as arising when a patent holder 
refuses to license a relevant patent on expected terms, thus “holding up” the 
progress of disseminating a new technology, regardless of whether the SSO was 
aware of the patent holder’s interest when creating the standard.37 Chien and 
Lemley note that patent holdup is an especially pernicious threat in the case of 
multicomponent products where the claims of the asserted patent cover only a 
small part of the product.38 Thus, the importance of protecting IP rights must be 
balanced against preventing abusive tactics in order to protect consumers, 
competition, and innovation in these industries.39 
SSOs, aware of the potential abuse of patents in the context of standards, often 
adopt intellectual property rights (IPR) policies aimed at curbing such abuses to 
remove potential barriers to standard adoption.40 For instance, to facilitate the 
adoption of standards, SSOs often require patent holders to agree to license 
essential patents on FRAND terms.41 Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and Schmalensee 
suggest that FRAND commitments are intended to curb possible attempts to exploit 
the increased market power that comes with owning a patent that is used in a 
standard.42 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. Speegle, supra note 23, at 848–49. 
 36. M. Sean Royall, Amanda Tessar & Adam Di Vincenzo, Deterring “Patent Ambush” 
in Standard Setting: Lessons from Rambus and Qualcomm, 23 ANTITRUST, no. 3, Summer 
2009, at 34, 34. 
 37. See Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 10 (stating that patent holdup can either be in 
the form of “bait-and-switch,” where the patentee increases the licensing cost unexpectedly, 
or “snake-in-the-grass,” when it is a third party that unexpectedly asserts a patent). Merges 
and Kuhn refer to snake-in-the-grass holdups as “strategic rent-seeking.” Id. at 25. 
 38. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public 
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39 (2012).  
 39. See id. at 6; Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 49. Chien and Lemley also note that 
much patent infringement litigation in this sort of context involves inadvertent infringement. 
Chien & Lemley, supra note 38, at 6. 
 40. See, e.g., INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION & 
INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON PATENT 
POLICY FOR ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC (2d ed. 2012), available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub
/itu-t/oth/04/04/T04040000010003PDFE.pdf. 
 41. See id. at 7–8. 
 42. Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents for 
Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672 (2007). 
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However, companies in high technology industries often possess large patent 
portfolios, making it difficult for the company representatives who are involved 
with the standard-setting process to know if the company owns essential patents. 
Additionally, a patent may be bought and sold multiple times during its lifetime, 
and these patent transfers may complicate FRAND commitments. Patent transfers 
in the standards context raise two important questions related to the patents at issue 
and the implicated parties: (1) has the new patent holder obtained a patent covering 
a technology that is subject to a FRAND commitment, and (2) is the new patent 
holder a party that will be bound by a FRAND commitment?  
Once a standard is set, standard adopters are locked in, and switching costs are 
often very high if new circumstances arise—for example, if a patent owner starts 
suing every company that makes products that comport with the standard.43 It is 
likely to be difficult to anticipate where these possible abuses might come from. A 
company may appear suspicious if it acquires a large number of patents, but the 
company might be acquiring these patents for defensive purposes, with no intention 
to assert them in litigation except in counterclaims. Similarly, Merges and Kuhn 
warn that post-standard patenting may be a sign of bad faith strategic rent-seeking, 
but a study by Layne-Farrar indicates that less than a third of patents obtained after 
a specific standard was finalized were opportunistic.44 But if patent holdup does 
occur, this can increase the cost of the technology for consumers and also cause 
significant delays and inefficiencies in the standard-setting process.45 
One of the most pervasive issues in the SSO context is that FRAND is rarely if 
ever defined in advance of a conflict.46 SSOs generally do not get involved with 
setting licensing terms, which Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and Schmalensee note may be 
in part due to the possible antitrust concerns if an SSO existed as an organization of 
competitors that also discussed pricing strategies.47 Instead, SSOs adopt vague 
language requiring fairness and reasonableness, leaving it to the courts to determine 
what license terms would be fair and reasonable.48 The courts and the parties in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. See Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 6 (noting the problems of lock-in and 
collective switching costs in the standards context). 
 44. Compare id. at 25 (suggesting that the timing of patent applications might indicate 
bad faith on the part of the applicant), with Anne Layne-Farrar, Innovative or Indefensible? 
An Empirical Assessment of Patenting Within Standard Setting, INT’L J. IT STANDARDS & 
STANDARDIZATION RES., July–Dec. 2011, at 1, 13 (noting that the author’s analysis of 
forward citations indicates that only between 10%–30% of patents obtained after a standard 
is set are actually opportunistic). 
 45. Speegle, supra note 23, at 849. 
 46. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (determining an appropriate FRAND royalty). 
 47. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 42, at 678–79. It may be worthwhile to consider the 
possibility of creating a limited antitrust exception, such as that available for insurance 
companies under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006). Such an 
exception could avoid possible antitrust concerns raised by the activities of some SSOs or 
patent portfolio management entities. Such a proposal would be driven in part by the market 
benefits that might accrue if patentees and/or licensees could, for example, share information 
related to pricing and licensing payments. However, this substantial and perhaps 
controversial reform proposal is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 48. See Speegle, supra note 23, at 853 (arguing that the FRAND commitments are too 
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conflict may then apply economic models or legal tests to determine the value of 
the patent’s contribution to the standard or the whole product,49 and this type of 
approach may be taken by scholars as well.50  
C. Essential Patents in Standards 
Before we turn to a more thorough examination of the behavior of SSOs, we 
must explain one of the foundational issues to which we will refer: essentiality. By 
doing so, this Part will also lay the groundwork for resolving one of the five issues 
that this Article examines.  
Above, we noted that one of the major questions that arises in the context of 
FRAND commitments and patent transfers concerns which patents the agreements 
apply to.51 This question often turns on the concept of essentiality. Many times, 
standards will rely on proprietary technologies still under patent, often called SEPs. 
The IPR policies of SSOs often refer to SEPs as being covered by FRAND 
commitments, and require SSO members to disclose SEPs that the members own.52 
When disclosed, the term “declared essential patents” may be used to describe 
these patents, indicating the unverified nature of the patent’s essentiality.53  
But what are SEPs? Often, SEPs are characterized as technologically essential 
patents,54 and this technological essentiality is tied closely with the interoperability 
focus of the standard. However, the concept of essentiality encompasses many 
ideas, and discussions of essentiality sometimes use the same term to refer to 
different ideas. Lemley warns that an understanding of essentiality that is too broad 
threatens to complicate the process of IP disclosures,55 but in our view an 
understanding that is too narrow also threatens to undervalue certain technologies. 
In this Part, we aim to explain and clarify some of the possible meanings of 
essentiality in the context of standards.  
When the Department of Justice (DOJ) evaluates entities for possible antitrust 
issues, the DOJ may issue business review letters.56 The DOJ has evaluated several 
                                                                                                                 
vague and “often provide at most a questionable foundation on which to base litigation over 
patent licensing disagreements”). 
 49. See, e.g., Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *13. 
 50. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 42, at 676. Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and 
Schmalensee apply economic models to various possible circumstances, and they conclude 
that the equilibrium royalty rate will be highest when there is no competition, lower when 
there is imperfect competition, and minimal when there is perfect competition. Id. at 692–93. 
 51. See supra Part I.B. 
 52. See, e.g., INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N ET AL., supra note 40, at 2. 
 53. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 54. E.g., EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., ETSI Intellectual Property Rights 
Policy, in ETSI RULES OF PROCEDURE 35, 41 (2011), available at http://www.etsi.org/images
/etsi_ipr-policy.pdf (defining “essential” as referring to technical, but not commercial, 
essentiality).  
 55. See Lemley, supra note 19, at 1959 (warning that the inclusion of “unnecessary 
patents will complicate the disclosure and licensing processes”). 
 56. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2012). 
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patent pools relating to technology standards, including MPEG-LA in 199757 and 
two pools relating to the DVD standard in 199858 and 1999.59 The DOJ ultimately 
permitted the actions of these entities, with one of the important factors being that 
each pool was limited to essential patents.60 However, the DOJ did not address how 
essentiality should be interpreted, just whether the pool’s approach to essentiality 
was acceptable.61 In the MPEG-LA letter, the DOJ noted with approval that 
MPEG-LA’s patent pool was limited to patents that were “essential to compliance” 
with the MPEG-2 standard.62 In the First DVD Letter, the DOJ approved of the 
pool’s definition of essentiality as being “necessary (as a practical matter) for 
compliance” with the standard.63 In the Second DVD Letter, the DOJ approved of 
the pool’s definition of essential patents as being patents that would be “necessarily 
infringed,” or for which “there is no realistic alternative.”64  
After discussing essentiality with industry members,65 we posit that there are 
three primary possible types of essentiality: (1) core essential, meaning the patent is 
technologically essential to a core function of the standard; (2) noncore essential, 
meaning the patent is technologically essential to an optional function of the 
standard; and (3) commercially essential, meaning the patent’s claims cover an 
option that is not technologically essential to the standard, but other factors exist 
making the patent commercially essential. A standard may also discuss 
technologies covered by “non-essential” patents, meaning the patent claims of a 
single patent may describe one of several alternatives for implementing the core or 
noncore features described by the standard.  
These three primary options also partially mirror the approaches taken with 
respect to the MPEG-2 and DVD standards, as approved by the DOJ. For the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., DOJ, to 
Gerrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997) [hereinafter MPEG-LA Letter], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf. 
 58. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., DOJ, to Garrard [sic] 
R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998) [hereinafter First DVD Letter], available 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf. 
 59. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., DOJ, to Carey R. 
Ramos, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999) [hereinafter Second 
DVD Letter], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.pdf. 
 60. See First DVD Letter, supra note 58, at 15; MPEG-LA Letter, supra note 57, at 16; 
Second DVD Letter, supra note 59, at 16. 
 61. See First DVD Letter, supra note 58, at 11; MPEG-LA Letter, supra note 57, at 11; 
Second DVD Letter, supra note 59, at 13. 
 62. MPEG-LA Letter, supra note 57, at 9. 
 63. First DVD Letter, supra note 58, at 11. 
 64. Second DVD Letter, supra note 59, at 3. 
 65. In the initial stages of our research, we received feedback from industry 
professionals at companies including Google, Microsoft, Research In Motion, and IBM. This 
collaboration was made possible by our participation in the Symposium on Management of 
Intellectual Property in Standard-Setting Processes, which was held in October 2012 by the 
Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy at the National Academy of Sciences. 
Bd. on Sci., Tech. & Econ. Policy, Symposium on Management of Intellectual Property in 
Standard-Setting Processes Agenda, NATIONAL ACADEMIES, http://sites.nationalacademies
.org/PGA/step/PGA_070838. 
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MPEG-2 standard, “essential to compliance”66 is fairly strong wording that we 
would interpret as referring to core essentiality. As referenced in the First DVD 
Letter, “necessary (as a practical matter) for compliance”67 can be understood as 
including core essentiality and noncore essentiality, and potentially also 
commercial essentiality. The Second DVD Letter’s reference to patents for which 
“there is no realistic alternative”68 indicates that this third pool might consider 
commercially essential patents to also be essential. 
Based on our communications with industry representatives, we posit that 
commercial essentiality may be understood along a continuum, from broad to 
intermediate to narrow. Under our broad definition, a technology would be 
commercially essential when nearly unanimous market demand for the option 
renders it necessary for competitors to include that option in order to compete. Our 
intermediate view of commercial essentiality emphasizes technologies that enable 
interoperability, which developers of complementary technology will need to use in 
order to make their products compatible. Thus, while the broad view might 
characterize patented features as commercially essential based on their popularity 
in the market, the intermediate view relies on popularity of a technology that is tied 
to interoperability. Our narrow definition, in contrast, would limit commercial 
essentiality to non-essential patents that are nevertheless included within the 
standard. There are two main options for a non-essential patent to be considered a 
commercially essential patent: (1) the alternative technologies would be too costly, 
leaving only one technology that is commercially feasible; or (2) one of the options 
is preferred over others by such a great margin that it is not commercially feasible 
to instead implement one of the alternatives. 
Opinions vary as to whether commercially essential patents should be treated the 
same as technologically essential patents. Lemley argues that FRAND 
commitments should only apply to essential patents, reasoning that allowing 
FRAND commitments to apply to non-essential patents would “complicate the 
disclosure and licensing processes” and could result in members disclosing patents 
with the twin goals of (1) avoiding nondisclosure liability and (2) obtaining royalty 
payments.69 But Lemley characterizes patents that are “necessary as a practical 
matter” as being essential,70 echoing the definition of essentiality referenced in the 
First DVD Letter, which suggests that Lemley might view essential patents as 
including some commercially essential patents, not just technologically essential 
patents. It is unclear, however, whether Lemley would adopt a broad, intermediate, 
or narrow characterization of commercial essentiality. On the other hand, Professor 
Shapiro defines essential patents as patents that are “necessary to comply with [the] 
standard,”71 similar to the “essential to compliance” definition referenced in the 
MPEG-LA Letter.72 This narrower wording suggests that Professor Shapiro would 
view the term “essential patents” as being limited to technologically essential 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. MPEG-LA Letter, supra note 57, at 1. 
 67. First DVD Letter, supra note 58, at 3. 
 68. Second DVD Letter, supra note 59, at 3. 
 69. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1959. 
 70. Id. at 1958. 
 71. Shapiro, supra note 22, at 136. 
 72. MPEG-LA Letter, supra note 57, at 9. 
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patents. If this “necessary to comply” language is taken literally, Shapiro’s position 
might also be read as limiting technological essentiality to core essential patents. A 
related problem concerns the possibility that non-essential patents could later 
become commercially essential, and whether these newly essential patents should 
be treated as subject to earlier FRAND commitments. 
SSOs vary in how they address the question of technologically versus 
commercially essential patents.73 Whether a technology is considered an SEP is 
largely determined by the SSO’s IPR policy. Commercially essential patents are 
considered SEPs by only a minority of SSOs. The Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) is one of the few SSOs 
that permits commercially essential patents to be SEPs, and the IEEE-SA’s 
definition adopts the narrow view of commercial essentiality that only covers 
otherwise non-essential technologies that were already mentioned in the standard.74 
At this point, an illustration may be helpful. One aspect of the smartphone patent 
war concerns the use by competitors of some of the patented design elements of 
Apple products, like slide-to-unlock.75 A broad definition of commercially essential 
might characterize this feature as commercially essential if nearly all smartphone 
users demand it. Slide-to-unlock is an example of a user interface technology that 
may be very popular but has little if anything to do with the underlying 
functionality of a smartphone. Google takes an intermediate approach to 
commercial essentiality, arguing that some popular technologies are so central to 
interoperability and necessary for complementary technologies that they should be 
viewed as de facto standards, with relevant patents treated as SEPs.76 Slide-to-
unlock would not be considered commercially essential under an intermediate 
definition because it is a feature that only concerns the user interface and not 
interoperability. The IPR policy of IEEE-SA provides an example of the narrow 
view of commercial essentiality, defining an “essential patent claim” as a claim that 
“was necessary to create a compliant implementation of either mandatory or 
optional portions” of the standard, for which there is “no commercially and 
technically feasible non-infringing alternative.”77 Slide-to-unlock would probably 
not be considered narrowly commercially essential, because it is likely that the 
designers of a product could come up with many different ways to activate a 
device.78 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Compare EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54, at 41 (excluding 
commercial essentiality), with INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, IEEE-SA 
STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6.1 (2012), available at http://standards.ieee.org/develop
/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf (including commercial essentiality). 
 74. INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73. 
 75. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 838, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 76. John Paczkowski, Google Says Some Apple Inventions Are So Great They Ought to 
Be Shared, ALL THINGS D (July 20, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20120720/google
-claims-popularity-has-made-some-apple-patents-de-facto-essentials/. 
 77.  INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6.1 (emphasis 
added). 
 78. For example, consider our device activation technique in the hypothetical set forth 
below in Part I.E, where we consider a Widget activation method that involves waving the 
Widget in the air like a magic wand. 
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In our view, SSOs should be permitted to consider commercially essential 
patents as SEPs but should make it explicit in their IPR policies if they do so. In the 
absence of an explicit provision, it may be appropriate to limit the term “essential 
patent” to one or both types of technological essentiality. If commercially essential 
patents are considered to be SEPs, we suggest adopting the narrow definition of 
commercial essentiality. The narrow definition encourages innovation above the 
standard, since any such improvements would be treated as proprietary 
technologies instead of being swallowed by the standard. The biggest problem with 
the broad definition of commercial essentiality is that there is no ex ante 
determination—the more successful the improvement, the more likely the 
improvement will be declared to be a standard, essential at some unknown future 
time, thus reducing the value that an innovator can realize by improving on a 
standard. Regardless, parties would still be free to include broadly commercially 
essential patents in licensing negotiations.  
Even if a clear definition of essentiality is adopted, that will not resolve all of 
the problems that companies have when determining whether they own patents that 
should be declared as essential to the SSO. This determination requires the SSO 
members to search through all of the patents that their respective companies own, 
which some compare to looking for a needle in a haystack.79 But we expect that if 
this is a known variable, the above characterizations of essentiality will greatly 
assist in the process of categorizing known patents into the proper type of 
essentiality. It is to the difficulty of meeting SSOs’ requirements that we now turn. 
D. Requirements Imposed by SSOs Prior to Standard Adoption 
SSOs generally adopt IPR policies that set forth their members’ obligations with 
regard to intellectual property implicated by the standard.80 During the 
standard-setting process, a board or committee may request that members disclose 
relevant patents, and it may also seek commitments from patent holders to license 
these patents on either royalty-free (FRAND-RF) or FRAND terms to anyone who 
requests a license.81  
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 42, at 677 (referencing findings of empirical work by 
Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole). Declaring that a patent is essential is often a 
judgment call. Id.  
 80. E.g., EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54, at 35–36 (requiring 
members to disclose essential patents and commit to licensing essential patents on FRAND 
terms). 
 81. FRAND-RF and FRAND terms are often seen as alternatives to one another. In the 
standards context, parties occasionally cross-license on FRAND-RF terms, as Apple allegedly 
offered to do if ETSI adopted its design for a new nano-SIM card as essential to a new 
standard. Eric Slivka, Apple Offers Royalty-Free Patent Licenses to Push Proposed Nano-SIM 
Standard, MACRUMORS.COM (Mar. 26, 2012, 6:47 AM), http://www.macrumors.com/2012
/03/26/apple-offers-royalty-free-patent-licenses-to-push-proposed-nano-sim-standard/. In 
some cases, SSOs might also treat FRAND-RF licenses as a punitive measure, as in the case 
of SSOs that include provisions in their IP policies requiring members to license on FRAND-
RF terms if they own essential patents that they fail to disclose. E.g., VITA STANDARDS ORG., 
VSO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 14 (rev. 2.6 2009), available at http://www.vita.com/home
/VSO/vso-pp-r2d6.pdf. 
2014] FRAND’S FOREVER 245 
 
Depending on the member’s business model, however, requiring the disclosure 
of all potential SEPs might be very costly and burdensome. A member company 
with a large patent portfolio, for instance, might have hundreds of patents that are 
potentially relevant to a standard that is being developed. In such a situation, the 
member would have to read through each claim of every potentially relevant patent 
to identify patents that might be essential to a standard that has not yet been 
finalized or adopted. Having attorneys review all of these patents would likely be 
cost prohibitive, but the main alternative to doing so would be to assign the task to 
experienced technical professionals who are familiar with the proposed standard, 
thereby taking these individuals away from their normal responsibilities.  
Thus, companies may have an incentive to not undertake expensive 
investigations of their own patent portfolios for the purpose of disclosing specific 
patents as potential SEPs. However, such companies may be more willing to make 
a blanket commitment to the SSO to license any SEPs on FRAND terms without 
identifying the SEPs individually. Such blanket commitments can save time on the 
front end but will not obviate the need to eventually examine the patent portfolio 
for SEPs, especially if part of the portfolio is being assigned to another company. 
If the company makes a broad commitment, what happens if one of the patents 
that might be covered is then transferred? The IPR policy of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) is seemingly written with this situation in mind. 
In section 7, concerning assignment and transfer of patent rights, the ITU requires 
members to make reasonable efforts to secure an assignee’s agreement to be bound 
by commitments that the patent owner reasonably believes it made to the ITU.82 
Thus, the question becomes whether there is a reasonable belief that the transferred 
patent was covered by this broad commitment. 
Broad commitments would likely be less appealing to patent owners when the 
SSO requires licensing to be on royalty-free terms. Because patent owners would 
be unlikely to make broad commitments to license their entire patent portfolio on a 
royalty-free basis, these broad commitments are likely to only appear when the 
SSO emphasizes FRAND commitments and the availability of royalties. Some 
SSOs allow patent owners to choose between committing to FRAND-RF licensing 
and FRAND licensing.83  
FRAND commitments are generally between the patent holder and the SSO. 
However, apart from the amorphous language requiring that licenses be fair, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, the SSO generally provides no guidance for 
what terms will be acceptable.84 It is also not always clear from the language of the 
IPR policy if the policy covers: (1) core essential and noncore essential patents; (2) 
only core essential patents; or (3) both types of technologically essential patents as 
well as commercially essential patents. Even if the policy specifically enumerates 
commercial essentiality, parsing the language will likely be necessary to determine 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N ET AL., supra note 40, at 5. 
 83. See, e.g., AUDIO VIDEO CODING STANDARD WORKGROUP OF CHINA, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICY ch. IV, art. 12 (2008), available at http://www.avs.org.cn/en/ 
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whether the IPR policy refers to broad, intermediate, or narrow commercial 
essentiality.  
Standards are very important in industries with large network effects. When a 
standard is widely adopted, small companies can compete with large companies on 
a national level, or even a global level, by innovating and creating a new 
technology that is nonetheless interoperable with technologies already broadly 
accepted and used by the public.85 Interoperability can aid in the adoption of the 
new technology by easing the transition from the old to the new. Thus, standards 
can be used to support a competitive environment, but misuse of SEPs can interfere 
with this goal. Ideally, SSOs would effectively address potential problems in the 
standard-setting process ex ante, and parties that own SEPs could be trusted to not 
take advantage of standards to demand higher royalties from competitors than the 
individual patents would warrant on their own. The patent litigation of the last few 
years, however, suggests that this may be an area in need of policy oversight.86  
E. Highlighting FRAND Problems—A Hypothetical 
There are several major problems with patents and standards that will become 
more visible in the near future, and there is a dire need to determine the optimal 
legal theories to use in resolving these problems. To illustrate the issues, consider 
the following hypothetical situation. A chart depicting the relationships between 



















                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *5 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“SSOs seek to promote widespread adoption of their standards 
because the interoperability benefits of standards depend on broad implementation.”). 
 86. See infra Part II. 
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FRAND COMMITMENTS IN THE WIDGET WORLD 
The Widget is a technology that is growing in popularity because of its ability to 
help people communicate. However, there are many ways to make a Widget. Widgets 
can be designed in a number of sizes, or using a number of different technologies. 
Widgetech makes one Widget that relies on combining a five-inch Widget-1A with a 
Widget-2C that transmits data at a frequency of 120 MHz. It currently licenses the 
patent for the five-inch Widget-1A from Gizmo, Inc. and holds the patent for the 
Widget-2C used in its Widget. Widgecom makes another Widget that relies on 
combining a three-inch Widget-1D with a Widget-2B that transmits information at a 
frequency of 20 MHz. Widgecom licenses the patent for the three-inch Widget-1D 
from G-Tech Corp. and the patent for the Widget-2B from HF Gadget, Inc. 
It has become obvious that the Widget technology has the potential to be very 
beneficial for consumers, but currently, customers of Widgetech cannot change to 
Widgecom’s service, and vice versa, because the two Widget technologies are too 
different. Because Widget technologies are not uniform, most people have elected to 
instead continue using Wadgets, an older technology that does not work as well or 
have as many features as the Widget, although the Wadget does allow content to be 
broadcast to a television. The Widget industry forms an SSO with the intent of 
developing a standard for Widget technology. Widgetech, Gizmo, G-Tech, and HF 
Gadget are all members of this SSO. Widgecom, however, does not join the SSO. The 
Widget SSO focuses on the current specifications used by Widgetech and Widgecom 
to determine what the standard should be, and thus has four different options for a 
Widget specification. 
 
Widget-1A and Widget-2C Widget-1A and Widget-2B 
Widget-1D and Widget-2B Widget-1D and Widget-2C 
 
After evaluating the different options for Widgets, the five-inch Widget-1A and a 
20 MHz Widget-2B are eventually adopted as essential elements of the Widget 
standard, and Gizmo and HF Gadget both disclose to the SSO that they have patents 
on these respective technologies. The Widget SSO also addresses the possibility that 
consumers may want to use the Widget to broadcast to their televisions, so the 
organization notes that if a Widget producer wishes to make its Widget compatible 
with this purpose, the producer should use the Widget-3 technology, which is covered 
by a patent owned by Doodad LLC. Gizmo’s Widget-1A and HF Gadget’s Widget-
2B are both core essential patents for the Widget, and the Widget-3 is a noncore 
essential patent. Doodad LLC is not a member of the Widget SSO, but it is a member 
of the Wadget SSO, which adopted their Widget-3 patent as a core essential patent. 
Upon the SSO’s request, all of the SSO members (including Gizmo; G-Tech; and 
HF Gadget) sign an agreement with the SSO promising to license their relevant 
patents on FRAND terms to parties that wish to adopt the standard. Shortly after the 
standard has been finalized, Gizmo buys Doodad LLC’s patent portfolio, and HF 
Gadget sells its patent portfolio to PatBuy, Inc. PatBuy is a patent assertion entity that 
relies on patent royalties for most of its revenue.  
A year after the standard has been set, the market for Widgets has grown, and 
consumers are almost universally demanding that Widgets include the capability of 
248 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:231 
 
broadcasting content to televisions, thus retaining one of the benefits of the Wadget. 
The Widget-3 patent, while initially a noncore essential patent, may also now be a 
commercially essential patent under the narrow definition thereof, even though it was 
not commercially essential when the standard was announced.  
Though none of its technologies were included in the standard, G-Tech has entered 
the standard-compliant Widget market, having licensed the Widget-1A and Widget-
2B included in the standard. In addition, the G-Tech Widget also includes a patented 
technology that it calls Widget-4, whereby the product is activated by waving the 
Widget in the air with a clockwise circular motion and turned off by waving it in the 
air with a counterclockwise circular motion. The motion-sensing activation mode has 
proven so popular with consumers that every Widget owner wants to own a Widget 
with Widget-4 capabilities, and some market research indicates that 95% of current 
Widget consumers will not make a future purchase of a Widget if the Widget does not 
have Widget-4.  
After spending the better part of last year making their Widget production capable 
of producing Widgets that adhere to the new standard, Widgecom and Widgetech start 
to produce standard-complying Widgets. When the standard was announced, 
Widgecom sent a letter requesting a license for the Widget-1A patent to Gizmo, and a 
letter indicating an intent to continue licensing the Widget-2B patent to HF Gadget. 
Similarly, Widgetech sent a letter to Gizmo indicating an intent to continue licensing 
the Widget-1A patent, and a letter to HF Gadget requesting a license to practice its 
Widget-2B patent. Widgetech also decides that it wants to include a feature in its 
Widget to allow broadcasting to televisions, so it sends a letter to Doodad LLC to 
request a license for the Widget-3 patent. Additionally, Widgetech adds Widget-4 
capability to its Widget, and sends a letter to G-Tech to request a license.  
Widgecom’s attempt to license from Gizmo reaches a stalemate, and an acceptable 
royalty payment cannot be determined. Widgetech and Widgecom receive a letter 
from HF Gadget stating that they no longer hold the Widget-2B patent, but the letter 
does not say who the patent was assigned to. Widgetech receives a similar letter from 
Doodad LLC concerning the Widget-3 patent. G-Tech responds to Widgetech’s 
request with a cease and desist letter, threatening litigation if Widgetech infringes the 
Widget-4 patent. 
Gizmo sues Widgecom for infringing its Widget-1A patent and sues Widgetech for 
infringing its Widget-3 patent. Gizmo is seeking an injunction to prevent Widgetech 
and Widgecom from using these patents in their products.  
PatBuy sues Widgetech and Widgecom for infringing its Widget-2B patent and is 
seeking a very high royalty of 20% of the sale price of each unit sold that infringes the 
claims of the Widget-2B patent. Widgecom produces proof of its existing license of 
the Widget-2B patent, and the court quickly dismisses PatBuy’s claim based on well-
established law that preexisting licenses are binding against subsequent patent owners.  
G-Tech sues Widgetech for infringing its Widget-4 patent and seeks an injunction 
against sales of Widgetech products that include Widget-4.  
Widgetech and Widgecom both argue that even in cases where a license did not 
already exist, all of the patent owners are obligated to license these patents on FRAND 
terms, and thus the court should assist the parties in setting the terms of the license 
agreements. 
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Figure 1. Widget SSO Hypothetical 
 
This hypothetical illustrates several problems. A court evaluating the following 
problems is likely to first refer to the IPR policy of the Widget SSO. For our 
purposes, assume that the Widget SSO’s IPR policy requires FRAND commitments 
and the disclosure of SEPs, but is vague about essentiality. 
(1) Application to Nonmembers. Widgecom is not a member of the Widget SSO. 
Gizmo asserts that when it made its FRAND promise to the SSO, this promise only 
applied to SSO members. Can Widgecom benefit from the promise and obtain a 
license for the Widget-1A even though it is not a member of the Widget SSO? 
(2) Widget-3, Essentiality and After-Acquired Patents. The Widget-3 patent is 
now held by Gizmo, but it was acquired after Gizmo made the FRAND promise to 
license its patents. This situation contains two distinct problems with their own 
complications. At their cores, these two problems focus respectively on whether the 
FRAND commitment applies to a particular patent, and whether the FRAND 
commitment applies to a particular patent holder. 
(a) The first problem concerns the Widget-3 patent’s status as a noncore 
essential patent that now may also be commercially essential, and this problem 
contains three parts.  
(i) First, the parties will need to look at the IPR policy of the Widget SSO to 
determine whether noncore essential patents are considered SEPs. If the answer is 
yes, the FRAND commitment will apply to this patent, and the analysis for this 
problem ends here. 
(ii) If the above answer is no, the parties then ask whether the Widget SSO 
considers commercially essential patents to be SEPs. If that answer is no, the 
analysis ends and the FRAND commitment does not apply to this patent. 
(iii) But if the answer to the second subpart is yes, that introduces the problem 
of a noncore essential patent becoming commercially essential. The parties will 
then need to analyze the Widget SSO’s IPR policy to determine the frame of 
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reference for time—that is, does the IPR policy state that FRAND commitments 
apply to patents that were essential at the time the standard was published? 
(b) The second problem focuses on whether the particular patent holder is 
bound by the FRAND commitment. This problem concerns the Widget 3 patent’s 
status as an after-acquired patent, which Gizmo acquired only after making the 
initial FRAND commitment. As a company that made a FRAND commitment to 
license Widget patents, is Gizmo bound by this agreement such that it has to license 
the Widget-3 patent on FRAND terms? 
(3) Broad View of Commercial Essentiality. G-Tech is a member of the SSO and 
made a FRAND promise, but G-Tech’s Widget-4 patent was not included in the 
standard. However, the demand for Widget-4 capability is now very high. Should 
the FRAND commitment also apply to the Widget-4 patent such that G-Tech must 
license the patent on FRAND terms to Widgetech?  
(4) Transferability of FRAND commitment. PatBuy was not a member of the 
SSO, and did not make any FRAND promises. Does the FRAND commitment 
made by HF Gadget also bind PatBuy and limit the royalties that PatBuy can seek 
for the Widget-2B patent? 
(5) Remedies for Patent Infringement. Gizmo owns the Widget-1A patent, 
which is a core essential patent, and the Widget-3 patent, which is a noncore 
essential patent that may also be commercially essential. PatBuy owns the Widget-
2B, a core essential patent.  
(a) Is it consistent with Gizmo’s FRAND obligations to seek an injunction 
preventing nonmember Widgecom from using the Widget-1A patent? What about 
the Widget-3 patent? Is Gizmo’s request for an injunction to keep SSO member 
Widgetech from using the Widget-3 patent consistent with Gizmo’s possible 
FRAND obligations? 
(b) Assuming that the FRAND obligations associated with the Widget-2B patent 
“ran with the patent” and bound PatBuy as a successor in interest, the court will 
have to determine whether a demanded royalty of 20% of the sale price for each 
unit sold is “fair and reasonable.” This is fairly unlikely, but in the absence of a 
royalty agreement between the parties, the burden may be on the court to determine 
a royalty amount that would be consistent with PatBuy’s FRAND obligations.  
A final policy matter illustrated in this hypothetical that deserves a brief mention 
is transparency—that is, whether and to what extent recordation of assignments 
should be required. If patent transfers were required to be recorded with the 
USPTO, the above assignments to Gizmo and PatBuy might have been easier to 
track down. If the assignees had been easier to track down, the party seeking a 
license could have made a formal, prompt licensing request. Instead, Widgetech 
and Widgecom pushed forward with production of standard-compliant products to 
remain competitive, with the danger of patent litigation looming overhead, relying 
only on the earlier FRAND commitment to assure them that a license would be 
made available. Most of the above issues could be addressed through government 
intervention or through voluntary collaboration by SSOs, but it would likely be 
unreasonable to expect an SSO to keep track of patent transfers. Thus a 
transparency solution would likely require government intervention and would not 
have a corresponding private market solution.  
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1. Transparency 
The recordation of patent transfers already exists in some form in U.S. patent 
law, which currently allows patent assignments to take priority over subsequent 
transfers of the patent, but only if the patent assignment was recorded.87 However, 
this provision does not make recordation mandatory. On the other hand, Executive 
Order 9424, which was issued on February 18, 1944,88 does make recordation 
mandatory, but only for interests in patents held by government entities.89 
Some prominent policy actors, including academics,90 the FTC, and the USPTO, 
have expressed support for requiring recordation of patent assignments. The FTC, 
in a 2011 report on patent law issues, asserted that accurate patent assignment 
records would assist parties in clearing patent rights.91 In November 2011, the 
USPTO published a request for comments (RFC) concerning a possible rule change 
to make assignment recordation mandatory.92 Like the FTC, the USPTO also noted 
that uncertain patent ownership has the potential to complicate patent clearance and 
interfere with market efficiency.93 These justifications for transparency are 
especially relevant in the standards context, where incomplete information can lead 
to very costly harm.  
If the USPTO implements regulations to require the recordation of assignments, 
this could benefit parties, like Widgecom and Widgetech in the above hypothetical, 
who could more easily identify the new owners of the patents that they sought to 
license. However, to be useful, such regulations must balance concerns about costs 
and timing. As indicated by several comments in response to the RFC, the issue of 
costs is controversial because many fear that a recordation requirement would 
increase the costs associated with patent ownership.94  
The added cost of recordation should be weighed against the need for 
recordation to be timely. If the patent assignments to Gizmo Inc. and PatBuy went 
unrecorded for five years, Widgecom and Widgetech would not be benefited by the 
recordation requirement, because they needed that information less than a year after 
the transfer. We recommend that in the case of SEP transfers, prompt recordation 
of assignments should be required, perhaps within ninety days of an assignment. A 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006). 
 88. Exec. Order No. 9424, 9 Fed. Reg. 1959 (Feb. 18, 1944). 
 89. 37 C.F.R. § 3.11(b) (2012).  
 90. E.g., Colleen Chien, Comment to the USPTO: Recordation of Real-Party-in-Interest 
Information (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/rpii-f_chien
_130125.pdf.  
 91. FTC, supra note 8, at 131 (“Recording assignments of government-conferred rights 
to exclude is necessary to ensure public notice and will not unduly burden patent transfers.”). 
 92. Request for Comments on Eliciting More Complete Patent Assignment Information, 
76 Fed. Reg. 72372 (Nov. 23, 2011). 
 93. See id.  
 94. E.g., Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n’s Response to the USPTO “Request for 
Comments on Eliciting More Complete Patent Assignment Information” (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/a_ipo_120123.pdf (pointing out that in the case 
of some organizations, patent prosecution and patent ownership issues may be handled by 
two separate departments, or perhaps even by two entirely separate sets of outside counsel). 
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ninety-day deadline would be consistent with the current structure of § 261, which 
allows an earlier assignment to take priority when it is recorded within three 
months.95 This kind of recordation requirement for SEP transfers is what Merrill 
and Smith would refer to as a “notice strategy,” in that it provides a method to 
facilitate the disclosure of new information.96 Notice strategies are typically 
associated with rights in rem, a topic that we examine in more detail as it relates to 
SEPs in Part III.A.2. 
F. SSOs and IPR Policies  
In the hypothetical above, we intentionally omitted a detailed discussion of the 
Widget SSO’s IPR policy. This is because the IPR policies of SSOs often vary 
significantly. An SSO might, for example, require members to add their patent to 
the “patent pool,” which the SSO may then license to standard implementers as a 
package deal.97 In contrast, an SSO that emphasizes FRAND commitments 
typically leaves it to the patent owner and potential licensee to determine license 
terms.  
The first major aspect of an SSO’s IPR policy is the approach that the SSO takes 
to licensing obligations. Merges and Kuhn suggest that if the patent owner takes on 
an obligation, it is in the public interest to make that promise binding.98 We 
assume, as a baseline, that courts will generally conclude that patent owners are 
bound by the obligations that they accept in IPR policies.  
For our purposes, there are three main options for these obligations: (1) the SSO 
might request that members grant FRAND licenses; (2) the SSO might establish a 
patent pool to which members can contribute; or (3) the SSO might require patents 
to be licensed on royalty-free terms. The effectiveness of each of these three 
options is influenced by the industries and the business models of the participants. 
Devlin warns that FRAND-RF agreements could potentially lead to reduced 
innovation in some circumstances.99  
Patent pools are often discussed as an alternative to an SSO model,100 though 
some SSOs also include a patent pool licensing option. For example, the IPR policy 
of China’s Audio and Video Coding Standard (AVS) Workgroup allows members 
of the subgroup developing a standard to select between these three types of 
licensing obligations (FRAND, FRAND-RF, or participation in the patent pool).101 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006). 
 96. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 805 (2001). 
 97. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 7. But see Lemley, supra note 19, at 1951 
(considering SSOs to be similar to patent pools, but not the same). 
 98. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 23. 
 99. See Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting and the Failure of Price Competition, 65 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 217, 227 (2009) (“But an SSO's insistence on royalty-free licensing may 
be undesirable with respect to technological innovation in the long run if other forms of 
compensation to the patentee are not forthcoming.”).  
 100. Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based 
Patent Licensing (Feb. 13, 2013) (unpublished working paper) ( on file with authors).  
 101. See AUDIO VIDEO CODING STANDARD WORKGROUP OF CHINA, supra note 83, at 5–6.  
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Under the AVS policy, if a member is not a part of the relevant subgroup when the 
standard is adopted, the member has a fourth option in addition to the above three 
options: to not take on any licensing obligation.102 Contreras proposes a “pseudo-
pool” arrangement to mix the benefits of patent pools with the benefits of SSOs,103 
but a true hybrid system as he proposes has not yet been adopted. Even in the case 
of SSOs like AVS, patent owners currently have to choose between FRAND 
commitments and patent pools.104  
SSOs that emphasize FRAND licensing vary among themselves as well. Most 
limit the policy to technologically essential patents, while others allow the FRAND 
commitment to apply to commercially essential patents.105 Additionally, some 
SSOs use broad language to describe the parties that are entitled to FRAND 
licenses, while others do not address FRAND commitment beneficiaries.106  
To get a sense of the variation, Lemley analyzed the intellectual property 
policies of over forty standard-setting bodies.107 Lemley categorized the SSOs 
according to: (1) whether the SSO had an IPR policy, and if so, what forms of IP 
were covered; (2) whether the SSO’s policy required disclosure of relevant patents; 
(3) whether the IPR policy addresses an obligation to search for relevant patents; 
(4) whether the SSO would permit the final standard to rely on proprietary 
technology (most said yes, though some qualified that technologies covered by IP 
rights would only be included if technologically necessary); and (5) what licensing 
provisions the IPR policies contained (e.g., FRAND-RF or FRAND).108  
Lemley’s data indicate that the IPR policies of SSOs vary significantly.109 One 
of the elements that a majority of the studied policies had was a disclosure rule, 
with twenty-four of thirty-six policies requiring members to disclose relevant IP 
rights.110 Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and Schmalensee note, however, that some firms 
view disclosure requirements as potentially harmful, insofar as disclosing patents 
might reveal future technology strategies to competitors.111  
Lemley’s conclusions also underscore what he sees as an important function of 
SSOs and their IPR policies: providing private ordering to mitigate negative effects 
that IP rights seem to have on innovation in some industries.112 Lemley’s empirical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. Id. at 6. 
 103. See generally Contreras, supra note 100 (suggesting that a pseudo-pool model could 
remedy the uncertainty of FRAND commitments).  
 104. AUDIO VIDEO CODING STANDARD WORKGROUP OF CHINA, supra note 83. 
 105. Compare EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54, at 41, with INST. 
OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6.1 (including commercial 
essentiality). 
 106. Compare AUDIO VIDEO CODING STANDARD WORKGROUP OF CHINA, supra note 83, at 
8 (defining “Licensees” as including “all Members and their Affiliates and all third party 
implementers of Compliant Portions”), with EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., 
supra note 54 (not discussing the beneficiary of the FRAND commitment). 
 107. Lemley, supra note 19. 
 108. Id. at 1903. 
 109. Id. at 1891. 
 110. Id. at 1904. 
 111. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 42, at 677–78. 
 112. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1971–72 (citing previous work indicating that patents can 
block improvements in the ICT industries). However, Lemley also says that IP rules must be 
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work lays an important foundation for the study of the standard-setting process. 
However, his work did not examine all of the facets of possible IPR policies, and a 
future study might aim at updating and expanding on Lemley’s findings from his 
2002 study. For example, future research might evaluate: (1) the different 
approaches of SSOs to patent transfers; (2) whether the licensing provisions apply 
equally to members and nonmembers of the SSO; (3) whether the IPR policies 
define essentiality; (4) whether the IPR policies address after-acquired patents; and 
(5) whether the IPR policies attempt to limit remedies that patent owners can seek 
in litigation over SEPs.  
In preparing this Article, we conducted a cursory overview of a small sample of 
IPR policies (IEEE-SA, ITU-T, ETSI, and AVS) to get a sense of whether 
Lemley’s conclusions about nonuniformity are still valid over ten years later. Based 
on our initial observations, we posit that Lemley’s observations in 2002 are also 
applicable to SSOs in 2013, where nonuniformity continues to be the unspoken 
rule. We noted that SSOs generally give members wide leeway in management of 
their own IP. IEEE-SA, for example, requires members to submit “Letters of 
Assurance” indicating if the member owns any “Essential Patent Claims,” but 
explicitly states that the policy does not create a duty to conduct a patent search.113 
Many SSOs also indicate a preference that patents be transferred subject to 
FRAND commitments,114 but SSOs also typically have a policy against getting 
involved in licensing matters.115 Thus, even if the IPR policies of SSOs were made 
more uniform, SSOs themselves generally do not provide an effective enforcement 
mechanism for these policies. Because the transferability of FRAND commitments 
is a cornerstone of this Article, we turn now to a more detailed discussion of the 
approaches that four SSOs take to this question. 
1. IPR Policies and Patent Transfers 
If an SSO specifically addresses transfers in its IPR policy, by agreeing to be 
bound by the terms of the SSO’s IPR policy, the member is agreeing to be bound 
by the SSO’s requirements for the transfer of intellectual property and FRAND 
commitments. To have any real force, however, IPR policies requiring patents to be 
transferred subject to FRAND commitments must either be combined with the 
property-based approach that we propose in Part III, or provide for harsh outcomes 
sufficient to deter the member from transferring the patent without obtaining the 
assignee’s consent to be bound by the FRAND commitment. We view IEEE-SA’s 
approach as a precursor to a full property-based approach to FRAND commitment 
transferability, because IEEE-SA notes that members should provide assignees 
                                                                                                                 
transparent and fair to fulfill this function. Id. at 1957. 
 113. INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6. 
 114. See, e.g., id. (requiring members to transfer patents subject to the FRAND 
commitment). 
 115. See, e.g., Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION 
(2013), http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx (“The detailed arrangements arising 
from patents (licensing, royalties, etc.) are left to the parties concerned, as these arrangements 
might differ from case to case.”). 
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with a “Statement of Encumbrance” that states that the patent is being transferred 
subject to existing encumbrances, including accepted “Letters of Assurance.”116 
In preparing this Article, we reviewed the IP policies of several SSOs, with an 
eye to getting an introductory understanding of the different approaches these SSOs 
take with regard to the transfer of patents covered by the standard. Even looking at 
just four IPR policies (IEEE-SA, ITU, AVS, and ETSI), we saw a variety of 
approaches to the issue of transferring essential patents. For instance, the 
approaches varied as to whether the transfer has to be subject to the same FRAND 
commitment or whether the SSO merely expresses a preference that the transfer be 
made subject to the same FRAND commitment.  
On this point, ITU and ETSI both require the member executing a transfer to 
notify the assignee of the relevant obligation.117 ITU also requires that the member 
who reasonably believes he is bound by a FRAND commitment as to the patents he 
is assigning must make “reasonable efforts” to obtain the assignee’s agreement to 
be bound by the FRAND commitment.118 However, if the member fails to obtain 
such an agreement upon making reasonable efforts, the ITU member will have no 
further express obligations with regard to the licensing commitment and the 
transfer.119 The ETSI policy also addresses an inability to obtain a FRAND 
commitment. Under section 8 of the ETSI policy, however, if an essential patent 
becomes unavailable after the standard is finalized, the burden is on ETSI to seek a 
commitment from the patent owner to license on FRAND terms, and a failure to 
obtain such a commitment could even lead to ETSI scrapping the entire standard.120 
On the other hand, both IEEE-SA and AVS require the patent owner to secure the 
assignee’s agreement to be bound, rather than merely requiring the patent owner to 
make “reasonable efforts” to do so.121  
These four SSOs thus represent three distinct approaches to transfers in an 
SSO’s IPR policy: (1) a statement of the SSO’s preference for transferability 
without imposing concrete obligations; (2) a requirement imposing some 
responsibility for obtaining FRAND commitments from new assignees on the SSO 
itself; and (3) a provision consisting of explicit language that transfers must be 
made subject to the FRAND commitment. Analysis of a larger sample might reveal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. INST. OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6. 
 117. Intellectual Property Rights, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION (Oct. 26, 2012), 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/default.aspx; Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in 
ETSI, EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST. (2012), http://www.etsi.org/about/iprs-in-etsi. 
 118. INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N ET AL., supra note 40, at 5.  
 119. See id. Section 7 of the IPR policy of the ITU, however, does specify that if the 
member had specifically identified patents to the standard-setting body, the member would 
be required to obtain the assignee’s consent to be bound by the same agreement as the 
member. Id. 
 120. EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., supra note 54, at 37–38. The approach 
taken by ETSI, where the SSO reserves a right to scrap the entire standard if a FRAND 
commitment cannot be obtained, is mostly unique because it is explicitly stated. Some 
indications suggest that this approach is fairly common in the standard-setting context, but 
many SSOs do not expressly refer to it in their IPR policies. 
 121. See INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N, supra note 73, § 6; AUDIO 
VIDEO CODING STANDARD WORKGROUP OF CHINA, supra note 83.  
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even more options. The fact that we found three different approaches to transfers in 
four SSOs, however, supports Lemley’s conclusions about nonuniformity in SSOs’ 
IPR policies and suggests that this nonuniformity is pervasive throughout IPR 
policies and is not limited to the categories that Lemley examined. 
Ultimately, we urge that SSOs should amend their IPR policies to address the 
issues that we raise in this Article. Further analysis may be beneficial to determine 
whether these IPR policy changes should be prospective or retrospective. Requiring 
the new IPR policy to only bind future standards might be easier to handle under 
traditional contract law, because otherwise new consideration might be required to 
bind parties to the amended policy.122 On the other hand, if the same SSO develops 
two standards that often are used in the same device, but one standard is governed 
by the pre-amendment IPR policy and one standard is governed by an amended IPR 
policy, the same lack of uniformity that is currently a problem between SSOs 
would actually exist within the same SSO.  
Uniformity among the approaches of different SSOs could also be beneficial, 
and this uniformity could be achieved through a voluntary consortium or through 
government intervention and oversight. As discussed below in Part II.B.3, formal 
contract law would likely be adequate for addressing issues relating to 
nonmembers, after-acquired patents, and essentiality, provided the IPR policy 
contained sufficient detail on these topics. However, contract law alone will not 
cause FRAND commitments to be binding on assignees in the absence of the 
assignee giving explicit consent to be bound.  
As the above discussion demonstrates, there are many issues that may arise 
when SSOs adopt standards that rely on patented technologies. The IPR policies of 
SSOs may attempt to address some of these issues ex ante, but SSOs are generally 
unable to exercise any control over the transfers of patents owned by members if 
the SSOs do not impose explicit terms to that effect. The law also appears to keep a 
largely “hands-off” approach with respect to patent assignments, deferring to the 
patent owners to make private deals with minimal oversight. This approach may be 
a positive attribute of the IP system in most contexts, but when SEPs are in issue, 
some additional oversight could be beneficial to ensure that patent owners also take 
the public interest into account. We turn now to the main category of legal 
oversight that has been thus far utilized in the context of standards issues: civil 
litigation resulting from a dispute. 
II. STANDARDS, LITIGATION, AND LEGAL THEORIES 
Due to the complexity of standards and IPR policies, there are many 
opportunities for companies to engage in unfair or inefficient behavior. In the 
interest of inclusiveness, we have decided to eschew the terms “patent holdup” and 
“patent ambush” in this Part. Each term is informative and descriptive, but the 
problems that arise in the standard-setting context may justify new terminology. 
“Patent holdup,” for example, is a phrase that describes the effect of an action, but 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. See, e.g., Glisson v. Global Sec. Servs., LLC, 653 S.E.2d 85, 87 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) 
(finding that continued employment was not sufficient consideration to make a noncompete 
agreement an enforceable contract).  
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not the action itself. On the other hand, “patent ambush” implies a degree of 
premeditation that may not exist when the ambushing patent was recently 
transferred from a FRAND-complying assignor to a FRAND-denying assignee. 
The patent misuse problems that are associated with the standard-setting process 
are also likely to be narrower than the implications of either of these terms. 
In our view, there are three main situations in which a patent holder may 
unfairly leverage his patent in the standard-setting context: (1) a patent may be 
concealed during the standard-setting process (“concealment”); (2) a patent holder 
may change his mind after making a FRAND commitment or otherwise seek 
arguably non-FRAND terms (“bait-and-switch”);123 and (3) a patent holder who 
made a FRAND commitment may transfer the patent to a third party that refuses to 
honor the FRAND commitment (“succession”).  
The first situation, concealment, may arise when a party has a patent that is 
essential to a standard under development, but intentionally fails to disclose this 
patent to the SSO. Once the standard has been adopted, this patent holder might sue 
good faith adopters of the standard for infringement. Concealment could be 
considered a specific type of patent ambush that is made possible because of the 
relationship between the patent owner and the SSO. Some SSOs address the 
problems raised by the threat of patent concealment by including provisions in their 
rules that require FRAND-RF licenses to be granted by patent owners that have 
intentionally concealed patents.124 If the patent holder would otherwise at least be 
entitled to a reasonable royalty for the use of the patent by standard adopters, a 
requirement that the patent holder license the patent on a royalty-free basis would 
be less appealing to a company that wants to earn revenue from its patents; thus, 
the IPR policy discourages concealment. 
In the second situation, bait-and-switch, a party may disclose his patent to the 
SSO and initially agree to license the patent on FRAND terms to anyone who 
requests a license. The patent owner might then later change his mind or otherwise 
demand excessive royalties from competitors that want to implement the standard. 
This situation is problematic in part because the potential licensee may have 
already made substantial investments in reliance on the FRAND promise.  
The third situation, where a patent is assigned to a successor in interest who did 
not make a FRAND commitment with the SSO, is less clear. The effect of patent 
transfers on the enforceability of FRAND commitments is currently an open 
question. The FRAND commitment is typically construed as a contract between the 
initial patent holder and the SSO,125 so the question arises of when and under what 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Here, we are using the term “bait-and-switch” in much the same way that Merges 
and Kuhn use the term. In their 2009 article, Merges and Kuhn refer to two potential types of 
patent holdup: snake-in-the-grass and bait-and-switch. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 10. 
Our category of “concealment” is similar to the Merges and Kuhn category of “snake-in-the
-grass,” but we used the term concealment because it is more in keeping with our theme of 
focusing on the actions rather than the effects. 
 124. See, e.g., VITA STANDARDS ORG., supra note 81, at 14 (“If a WG Member fails to 
adequately and timely disclose . . . a patent claim or license terms for it as set forth in this 
Section 10 . . . the VITA Member Company must license it to the extent it is essential to a 
Draft VSO Specification on a royalty free basis . . . .”). 
 125. E.g., Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (N.D. 
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circumstances a successor in interest can be bound by that contract and by whom. 
The approaches of SSOs vary on this point. Many state in their policies a 
preference that future assignees be bound by the FRAND commitment.126 
However, some SSOs merely require the contracting party to make a reasonable 
effort to obtain the assignee’s agreement to be bound, while others require that any 
assignment have the express condition of being subject to the FRAND 
commitment.127 SSOs also may vary on whether the agreement explicitly addresses 
granting licenses to nonmembers and whether the FRAND commitment applies to 
core essential, noncore essential, and commercially essential patents.128 
A. Litigation over FRAND Commitments 
Litigation over a FRAND commitment may come in several forms, which are 
most commonly focused on antitrust law or contract law.129 If the FRAND 
commitment creates a duty to negotiate in good faith, as some courts have 
suggested,130 the reality of negotiation introduces more complications. For 
example, in normal negotiations, if the party seeking a payment is the first to offer, 
it will often highball the other party, thus causing future negotiations to use that 
high initial offer as a reference point.131 Similarly, if the party that will be making a 
payment is the first to offer, it will often lowball the other party, and future 
negotiations may thus be anchored lower due to the lower initial reference point.132  
But what about negotiations when there is a FRAND commitment? Both parties 
know that the end result has to be fair and reasonable. The district court in 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. recently emphasized that an initial offer must be 
at least made in good faith.133 Additionally, some SSOs use language requiring that 
negotiations must be on FRAND terms, suggesting that the initial offer must also 
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 132. See id. 
 133. 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1038 (W.D. Wash. 2012).  
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abide by FRAND principles.134 If the initial offer is required to be on FRAND 
terms, this may restrict the ability of negotiators to use either highballing or 
lowballing techniques.  
When a patent owner has previously entered into a FRAND commitment, she 
may attempt to comply with this agreement at first and engage in negotiations with 
the potential licensee. However, if the negotiations are unsuccessful or not likely to 
be successful, the parties might file suit and request that a court intervene and set 
the FRAND terms. A court that is tasked with setting FRAND terms for a license 
may use a similar approach as when the court is asked to set a reasonable royalty or 
determine if a proffered royalty amount is reasonable. If a court is asked to 
determine if a royalty is reasonable, the court will often weigh a number of factors, 
possibly applying the fifteen-factor test of Georgia-Pacific.135 This can quickly 
become very complicated, as Judge Robart’s recent 207-page decision in Microsoft 
v. Motorola indicates.136 In the FRAND context, a court that is asked to set a 
royalty amount will likely have to consider the increased value that a patent enjoys 
merely by being essential to a standard and may eventually set the royalties at the 
level that would be appropriate if the patent’s value had not been inflated by its use 
in a standard.137  
As is true with most litigation, FRAND litigation is rarely focused on a single 
issue. Litigation over a FRAND commitment may raise antitrust issues, with one or 
both parties asserting that the other is behaving in an anticompetitive manner and 
violating antitrust law.138 Even if the FRAND commitment portion of the dispute is 
governed by principles of contract law, the parties are likely to raise patent issues 
as well, including patent validity.139 Because of the importance of contract law, 
however, FRAND commitment claims may be brought in state court or federal 
district court, and appeals may be heard by many different courts other than the 
Federal Circuit, which handles appeals of patent cases.  
If the case involves claims of patent infringement, the patent holder may also be 
seeking an injunction, a common remedy sought in patent cases. Under eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC,140 a four-factor test for determining the appropriateness of an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. See, e.g., Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, supra note 115. At least 
one court has read ITU’s patent policy as applying the FRAND requirement at the 
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injunction applies to patent disputes. To obtain a permanent injunction under that 
test, a patent owner must demonstrate the following: (1) irreparable injury; (2) the 
inadequacy of money damages to compensate for the injury; (3) that a remedy in 
equity is warranted after considering the balance of hardships between the parties; 
and (4) that a permanent injunction would not be harmful to the public interest.141 
Patent law inherently gives patent owners a right to exclude others from practicing 
their invention,142 so when a court determines that an injunction is not appropriate 
but that the nonowner was infringing the patent, the court may set an ongoing 
royalty rate; this resolution will provide reasonable compensation to a patentee who 
has effectively given up his right to exclude the infringer from practicing the 
patent.143 A study by Chien and Lemley found that there has been a reduction in 
injunctions since eBay, but the authors suggest that this reduction may be offset by 
the continued availability of injunctions in litigation before the International Trade 
Court (ITC),144 an issue that we discuss in more detail in Part IV.C. 
Bankruptcy is another area that these disputes occasionally implicate. Above, 
we noted that patents are often bought and sold. Sometimes, these purchases are not 
between two solvent companies, but instead occur when one of the companies is 
declaring bankruptcy and its patent portfolio is being sold to satisfy debts.145 Under 
the bankruptcy law of the United States, patents are generally treated as assets 
subject to sale by the trustee in the event that the patents are found to be non-
exempt assets of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to the bankruptcy code.146 Merges 
and Kuhn note that the interests of a bankruptcy estate are often very different from 
the interests of the original patent owner, as the bankruptcy estate has a fiduciary 
duty to creditors, and thus the estate has the incentive to maximize short term 
profits.147 IP licenses are granted some protection, with licensees generally being 
given the power to elect to retain their rights.148  
However, a FRAND commitment does not create an express license, though it 
arguably imposes on the patent owner a duty to negotiate in good faith; as such, the 
agreement’s fate under a bankruptcy proceeding is unclear. Because of the 
importance of FRAND commitments to public interest concerns, one option is for 
bankruptcy courts to treat FRAND commitments in a way similar to 
nondischargeable priority debts.149 The court and the parties can also take action to 
clarify this issue. In the bankruptcy proceeding for Nortel Networks Inc., the 
bankruptcy court stated that debtors would take assets free of any other liens or 
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interests, except for a few categories of interests.150 One of the enumerated 
categories that Nortel’s debtors took assets subject to was enforceable agreements 
with SSOs.151 The Nortel example shows that bankruptcy courts are receptive to 
arguments regarding the value of FRAND commitments made to SSOs, and that 
these courts have the power to prevent these commitments from being discharged 
in bankruptcy. 
Litigation over FRAND commitments is likely to involve many different legal 
areas and theories. Bankruptcy law may be implicated when the question is whether 
a FRAND commitment survives a bankruptcy proceeding, but this is likely to come 
up in a more narrow circumstance. Instead, much of the litigation in this context 
begins based on the patent owner’s claim for infringement, so defenses under 
patent law may be relevant. Because the effects that patent exclusivity has on 
competition can be especially harsh when the patents are part of a standard, 
arguments may also assert that the patent owner engaged in unfair competition or 
anticompetitive behavior. Finally, at its core, a FRAND commitment is a contract, 
so contract law doctrines are likely to influence outcomes of litigation. Thus, we 
turn now to a more detailed evaluation of these three areas of law (patents, antitrust, 
and contracts), and how they currently affect some of the major problems that we 
argue arise in the context of FRAND commitments and patent transfers.  
B. The Law of FRAND Commitments and Transferability 
When a patent holder assigns her patent to a third party, and the patent was 
previously subject to a FRAND commitment with an SSO, is the third-party 
assignee bound by this agreement? This is a difficult question that current law 
inadequately addresses. Currently, the discussion of these topics mostly focuses on 
patent law, antitrust law, and contract law.152 Patent law offers the weakest options 
for addressing FRAND disputes. The options under antitrust are somewhat stronger 
than under patent law but are fundamentally limited by the current nature of 
antitrust law in the United States. In terms of the legal theories that have been 
examined for these purposes, contract law has the most potential for addressing the 
problems set forth in the above hypothetical, but it still has many shortcomings.  
In this Part, we will discuss some of the current aspects of several areas of law, 
and then go into more detail in an attempt to conclude which theories, if any, are 
best suited to address the first four problems faced by the parties in our Widget 
hypothetical: (1) the transferability of FRAND commitments; (2) the enforcement 
of FRAND commitments by nonmembers of the SSO; (3) the application of 
FRAND commitments to “core” essential patents, “noncore” essential patents, and 
commercially essential patents; and (4) the application of FRAND commitments to 
after-acquired patents. The question of appropriate remedies is addressed separately 
in Part IV because these issues are most likely to be raised in the context of patent 
litigation, which historically has been associated with injunctions. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 150. In re Nortel Networks, 2011 WL 4831218, at *9. 
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1. Patent Theory 
Some principles of patent law may be applicable to the current controversy, 
including laches, equitable estoppel, implied licenses, or a theory that allows the 
original patent owner’s wrongdoings to be imputed to the successor in interest.  
a. Patent Law Cases 
Laches is a patent law doctrine that resembles a statute of limitations in that it 
prevents patent holders from profiting by their delay in bringing suit for 
infringement.153 A laches defense tends to follow the patent, and a patent assignee 
will be bound by the conduct of his predecessor in interest.154 When raising a 
defense of laches, the defendant must establish two things: (1) there was an 
unreasonable delay before the patent owner asserted a claim; and (2) the delay 
caused prejudice or injury to the defendant.155 The length of time necessary for a 
delay to be unreasonable varies with the situation, but a delay of six years or more 
is generally viewed as prima facie unreasonable.156 The prejudice prong may refer 
to economic prejudice or evidentiary prejudice.157 An inquiry concerning economic 
prejudice would focus on investments or damages that would not have accrued if 
the patent owner had brought suit sooner.158 An inquiry concerning evidentiary 
prejudice would focus on circumstances where the defendant’s ability to present a 
full defense on the merits has been prejudiced due to factors like a witness’s death 
or loss of records.159  
However, laches depends on notice of specific infringement and typically 
requires there to be a communication between the owner and infringer about that 
infringement.160 In the standards context, a patent holder may not have specific 
notice of every implementation of the infringing standard. Thus, even if the patent 
holder decides to wait several years to track down and sue specific infringers, the 
clock for laches would probably not start running unless the patent holder has 
notice about a particular infringing incident and has contacted the infringers about 
the possibility of litigation.161 Additionally, courts typically do not find economic 
prejudice based on the cost of infringing,162 and Merges and Kuhn suggest that this 
indicates that courts may not be receptive to an argument that the delay in bringing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 33–34. 
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suit deprived the standards adopter of the chance to find a noninfringing 
workaround.163 
A defense related to laches is equitable estoppel, which allows an accused 
infringer to claim that the patent owner’s “course of conduct reasonably gave rise 
to an inference” that the patent would not be enforced.164 Equitable estoppel and 
laches are both defenses that focus on nonenforcement, but equitable estoppel 
focuses on the mindset of the potential licensee, rather than that of the patent 
owner.165 Where laches requires the patent owner to be aware of specific 
infringement and fail to take action, equitable estoppel requires, at a minimum, that 
the accused infringer is aware that the patent owner made statements addressing 
nonenforcement of the patent and that the accused infringer then relied on that 
statement.166 The Federal Circuit, in A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides 
Construction Co., stated that reliance requires for the infringer to “have had a 
relationship or communication with the plaintiff which lulls the infringer into a 
sense of security.”167 Lemley notes that equitable estoppel arguments may also 
apply to statements made in the marketplace or directly to customers.168 Merges 
and Kuhn observe that in limited situations, silence may also contribute to an 
equitable estoppel defense as a misrepresentation if there was a clear duty to 
speak.169 
In the SSO context, Lemley suggests that equitable estoppel should exist when 
the standard adopter is aware of a statement that the patent owner made to the SSO 
concerning enforcement of the patent.170 However, Lemley expresses doubt that 
equitable estoppel would protect standard adopters who rely on FRAND promises 
because the promise does not prompt a reliance on nonenforcement of the patent, 
but rather it elicits an expectation that the patent will be asserted and reasonable 
royalties sought.171 The affirmative communication requirement of equitable 
estoppel may also limit the FRAND commitment to only benefiting other members 
of the SSO to whom the FRAND commitment was made.172 Additionally, if the 
patent owner fails to disclose relevant patents, it is unclear whether this failed 
disclosure passes the high bar for silence to be deemed misrepresentation.173 Thus, 
a slightly amended approach to equitable estoppel might be needed to address 
repudiated FRAND commitments, allowing a standard adopter to estop a patent 
owner from denying a license or seeking an injunction, even if the patent owner 
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was not the party that initially made the commitment to the SSO.174 Under the 
approach proposed by Merges and Kuhn, the proposed affirmative defense of 
standards estoppel should also survive assignment of the patent.175 
Case law about de facto standards suggests that courts may be receptive to 
arguments based on equitable estoppel. The idea that users of standards become 
reliant on the availability of the technology can be found in patent cases like Lotus 
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.176 In Lotus, the reliance interest 
was effectively created in the user who devoted time to learning the spreadsheet 
application Lotus 1-2-3.177 The court acknowledged that Lotus 1-2-3 “represented 
the de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet commands,” but concluded that if a 
better spreadsheet product became available, Lotus users should be able to apply 
their Lotus 1-2-3 knowledge and macros to the superior products instead of either 
learning a new system from scratch or being locked in to Lotus 1-2-3.178 
Another patent law option that might assist standard adopters when a patent 
owner reneges on a FRAND commitment is the possibility of implied licenses. An 
implied license is a quasi-contract doctrine that turns on the expectations of the 
parties in a sales transaction.179 Merges and Kuhn note that the implied license 
issue may arise in the case of a patented process that requires the use of a 
nonpatented item.180 In such a situation, a court might say that the purchaser of the 
nonpatented good has an implied license to use the patented process that the 
purchaser acquired the nonpatented good to use.181 Lemley has argued that viewing 
a FRAND commitment as an implied license would allow all of the standard 
adopters to benefit, regardless of whether they would have had standing to sue for 
contract damages, and that such an approach would also reduce opportunism in 
litigation over SEPs.182 However, Merges and Kuhn argue that such implied 
licenses would probably be construed very narrowly, and thus would not be likely 
to provide an effective remedy.183 
We have not located any FRAND-specific cases that emphasize an implied 
license theory, but implied licenses are an accepted possibility in patent law.184 
However, the cases addressing implied licenses generally focus on contexts where 
there is a relationship between the patent owner and the party claiming an implied 
license. For example, in Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics 
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America, Inc., the Federal Circuit found an implied license where Wang had 
entered into an agreement with Mitsubishi to manufacture (and then sell back to 
Wang) SIMM cards that Wang had developed.185 Wang did not inform either 
Mitsubishi or the SSO that it was seeking a patent on the SIMM technology.186 
Lemley has suggested that the implied license doctrine may assist in resolving 
disputes over FRAND commitments, arguing that the FRAND commitment creates 
an implied license under proper circumstances,187 but it is currently unclear how 
courts would respond to this argument.  
The final approach that we noted under patent law, imputing the wrongdoings of 
a predecessor in interest, is likely insufficient to address most of the disputes that 
would arise in the context of transferring patents subject to a FRAND commitment, 
but is worth noting. If the previous owner of the patent made an intentional 
fraudulent representation to the SSO or to the USPTO, that misrepresentation could 
potentially lead to the patent being ruled unenforceable because of the inequitable 
conduct.188 In Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., the court allowed such a claim to 
proceed where the claim was based on an assertion that LSI’s predecessor in 
interest (Lucent) “intentionally and knowingly made material misrepresentations 
and/or omissions in connection with standards-setting organizations.”189 The court 
in Barnes & Noble also noted that fraud, both prior and subsequent to patent 
issuance, can make a patent unenforceable.190 This theory may thus be an option for 
standard adopters if the potential licensee can establish that the patent was 
transferred for the purpose of avoiding the obligations of the FRAND commitment, 
but it is not likely to help in situations where the previous owner did not engage in 
intentional wrongdoing. 
The patent-related claims that concern FRAND commitments occasionally 
overlap with contract law claims, but not always in the same litigation. The 
interrelated nature of disputes over patents and FRAND commitments can lead to 
litigation being severely impeded, especially when the disputes are being addressed 
by different courts. Consider, for example, the Delaware case of Rembrandt 
Technologies v. Harris Corp.191 and the concurrent multidistrict litigation (MDL), 
In re Rembrandt Technologies, LP.192 In the litigation against Harris, one of the 
issues concerned the ‘627 patent and the application of a FRAND commitment that 
AT&T, Rembrandt’s predecessor in interest, made to the Advanced Television 
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Systems Committee (ATSC) during the promulgation of the HDTV standard.193 
Harris was not a party to the MDL, but the ‘627 patent’s validity was being 
challenged in the MDL, so Rembrandt sought Harris’s admission as to the ‘627 
patent’s validity.194 If Harris had admitted to the patent’s validity in the FRAND 
litigation, Rembrandt could have used that admission as evidence in the patent 
litigation. The concurrent disputes led to changes in the parties’ positions in the 
Delaware litigation when there were changes in the status of the MDL proceedings, 
to the occasional frustration of the courts.195 Patent issues, patent-based theories to 
address FRAND commitment issues, and contract claims would ideally be treated 
by the same court that has full access to information from the parties, but as 
Rembrandt shows, jurisdiction issues may make this difficult. This is another topic 
that is ripe for further analysis by policy professionals and academics. 
b. Insufficiency of Patent Law to Address FRAND Problems 
Patent law does not provide viable recourse when FRAND commitments are 
disregarded by assignees. The patent law doctrines of equitable estoppel and 
implied licenses are likely to be ineffective as defenses against patent litigation 
over SEPs. These doctrines are derived from some representation made by the 
patentee that is relied on by the infringer.196 Because of the lack of relationship 
between nonmembers and patent owners, an argument is likely to fail if it argues 
that a defense of laches, equitable estoppel, or an implied license supports FRAND 
commitment enforceability by nonmembers. A defense of equitable estoppel may, 
however, be available to SSO members if a court concludes that membership in the 
same SSO is sufficient to infer a relationship. These defenses, however, are 
unlikely to be very helpful in the context of after-acquired patents, as it is likely 
unreasonable to infer that a representation was made as to a patent that is not yet 
owned. 
2. Antitrust and Unfair Competition 
A second major area of law that is raised in the SSO context is antitrust and 
unfair competition.197 Lemley notes that to establish an antitrust violation of 
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monopolization or attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act, the party 
must prove the defendant’s “market power, anticompetitive conduct, and intent.”198 
Remedies for antitrust violations may include treble damages, attorney’s fees, and 
enforcement by antitrust authorities.199 The law of unfair competition, especially as 
set forth in section 5 of the FTC Act,200 is a body of law that often overlaps with 
antitrust law, though the term “antitrust” may also be understood in a more limited 
sense to refer to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. We discuss both Sherman Act 
claims and section 5 unfair competition claims in Part II.B.2.a. 
The overlap of antitrust law and patent law is the subject of much discussion 
among academics.201 Antitrust law aims to prevent abuses through monopolistic 
and anticompetitive behaviors, but some monopolies are lawful and permitted. 
Patents, for instance, always create a monopoly, and courts generally act with more 
deference to the patent system when weighing monopolistic behaviors by patent 
owners.202 SEPs, however, have the potential to be more harmful to competition 
and the market if that monopoly power is abused. When a patent owner has an SEP, 
therefore, a court may weigh the owner’s behavior as a patent owner against his 
obligations under antitrust law, affording somewhat less deference to the nature of 
the patent as a legal monopoly.203 However, Mossoff notes that there are many 
concerns about whether courts that shape antitrust law have an adequate 
understanding of the effects that such rulings might have on future technological 
innovation.204 
In the following Parts, we examine antitrust case law in more detail. As analysis 
of the case law shows, the viability of antitrust claims in the FRAND litigation 
context is ultimately unclear under U.S. law.  
                                                                                                                 
questions about whether the SSOs themselves violate antitrust law. See Lemley, supra note 
19, at 1937 (noting the existence of this argument). However, courts typically acknowledge 
the pro-competitive value of SSOs. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Via Techs., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 
1038, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“Without [technology standards], the industry would 
balkanize, improvements would slow, and consumers would suffer.”). Some scholars note, 
however, that the risk of violating antitrust law might partially explain why SSOs keep a 
“hands off” approach to licensing and the interpretation of FRAND. E.g., Layne-Farrar et al., 
supra note 42, at 678–79. 
 198. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1928. 
 199. Id. at 1927. 
 200. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).  
 201. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 761 (2002) (discussing the intersection of patent and antitrust law); James Gould & 
James Langenfeld, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Landing on Patent Avenue in the 
Game of Monopoly, 37 IDEA 449 (1997) (discussing the Clinton administration’s approach 
to antitrust issues in intellectual property). 
 202. Merges & Kuhn, supra note 30, at 14 (noting that authorities faced with antitrust 
claims often defer to patent law because of patent law’s inherent tradeoff between 
competition benefits and incentives for innovation). 
 203. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding 
that patent holdup in the form of unexpected enforcement of a declared essential patent was 
actionable under antitrust law). 
 204. Adam Mossoff, A Simple Conveyance Rule for Complex Innovation, 44 TULSA L. 
REV. 707, 735–36 (2009) (noting the institutional competence concerns). 
268 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:231 
 
a. Antitrust and Unfair Competition Cases 
Scholars and courts alike have often focused on competition law’s potential to 
address issues relating to standards and FRAND commitments.205 Antitrust law and 
the law of unfair competition are areas that are largely based on case law, because 
the governing statutes (e.g., the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Sherman Act, 
and the Clayton Act) are written in very high-level and general language. Thus, 
fact-specific inquiries are very important in antitrust and unfair competition 
cases.206 
Perhaps due in part to antitrust’s reliance on fact-specific inquiries, the legal 
conclusions about FRAND commitments and antitrust have been spotty. The case 
of Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,207 for example, emphasizes that there may 
be antitrust liability when there is active deception of the SSO.208 Similarly, in 
Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc.209 the court concluded that Motorola’s 
breach of a FRAND commitment was harmful to competition.210 The court in Vizio, 
Inc. v. Funai Electric Co.211 reasoned that there may also be antitrust liability when 
there is an active attempt to conspire to harm competition.212 However, under the 
reasoning in Vizio, the mere transfer of a patent is likely not enough to show 
anticompetitive behavior, and a refusal to abide by the FRAND commitment made 
by a predecessor in interest is not inherently harmful to competition.213  
The cases also indicate a trend toward requiring active deception of an SSO for 
antitrust liability to attach under the Sherman Act. The important case of Rambus 
Inc. v. FTC214 held that mere failure to disclose a patent application, even when the 
patent owner appears to have intentionally amended a patent application to make 
the claims fall within the standard specifications, would not sufficiently establish 
anticompetitive harm if the concealment was intended to avoid the royalty limits 
imposed by a FRAND commitment with the SSO.215 The Rambus court also held 
the FTC to a high causation bar, requiring a showing that, but for the concealment, 
the SSO would have chosen an alternative technology.216 Rambus further 
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emphasizes the Supreme Court case of NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.217 for the 
principle that fraudulent behavior along with harm to consumers in the form of 
increased prices was not a per se antitrust violation where the increased cost to the 
consumer could be attributed to the exercise of a lawful monopoly power.218 The 
Rambus court’s reading of NYNEX is problematic for plaintiffs in antitrust cases 
concerning patents in general and is potentially broad enough to restrict or 
eliminate the application of antitrust law in cases involving patents that are part of a 
standard. 
Because of cases like Rambus and Vizio, the application of antitrust law as a 
solution for a FRAND commitment dispute may be very limited. When there is an 
omission instead of an active attempt at deception, the reasoning of Rambus may 
persuade a court to find against antitrust liability. Similarly, Vizio seems to stand 
for the idea that antitrust liability does not automatically follow the patent. While 
Vizio left it open for antitrust liability to attach to conspiracies to harm competition, 
it also deferred to the patent owners with respect to the issues of patent transfer and 
repudiation of commitments made by a predecessor in interest.  
Similarly, as seen in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine may limit the ability of defendants to raise antitrust issues as 
counterclaims upon being sued for infringement.219 Because of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, antitrust counterclaims in response to a patent infringement 
suit may be limited to the extent that assertion of patent rights is viewed as the 
anticompetitive conduct.  
The FTC, which is one of the agencies authorized to enforce antitrust law, has 
also been very involved with these issues.220 Rambus overturned an FTC opinion 
where the FTC concluded that Rambus’s actions did amount to anticompetitive 
conduct.221 When the FTC decided the case against Rambus, it drew on both 
section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act, finding that Rambus 
had unlawfully monopolized several technology markets through its deceptive 
conduct.222 However, the D.C. Circuit did not address the section 5 aspects, 
because the FTC did not raise section 5 in its case before the D.C. Circuit.223 
Some FTC adjudications result in consent decrees, which focus on prohibiting 
future actions like the behavior under investigation, and the entry of a consent 
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decree requires the parties to withdraw the matter from adjudication.224 Many of 
these involve section 5 of the FTC Act.225 One of the first examples in the 
information age where the FTC investigated a company for standards-related 
misbehavior is In re Dell Computer Corp.226 There, the FTC found that Dell had 
violated section 5 of the FTC Act by failing to disclose its interest in an SEP and 
then exercising its rights against implementers of the standard eight months after 
the standard was adopted.227 Under the consent decree, Dell agreed that it would 
not assert its IPR in the relevant standard.228 
Another section 5-based FTC adjudication, which also resulted in a consent 
decree, involved the actions of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC (NData).229 In that 
case, the FTC ordered NData to comply with the terms of FRAND commitments 
that its predecessor in interest (National Semiconductor Corp.) made with the 
Standards Association of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 
(IEEE-SA).230 In the NData adjudication, the FTC concluded that NData’s actions 
with regard to the patent amounted to unfair competition under section 5 of the 
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, but the FTC did not establish a standard for determining 
when there are unfair practices in the standard-setting context.231 Merges and Kuhn 
also point to the lack of a unanimous decision in NData as indicative of antitrust’s 
inadequacy to address issues in the SSO context.232 
Recently, the FTC investigated Google’s activities relating to patents obtained 
when Google acquired Motorola Mobility (MM).233 MM had many patents that 
were considered to be SEPs, and prior to Google’s acquisition, MM threatened to 
seek injunctions against companies like Microsoft, Apple, and RIM for their use of 
these SEPs.234 Google then continued these practices, and the FTC’s initial order, 
published in January 2013, asserts that this pattern of injunction-seeking behavior 
in the case of SEPs is a violation of section 5.235 
As the Rambus case shows, the FTC is held to strict standards on review when 
FTC adjudication is based on the Sherman Act, claims of monopolistic behavior, 
and outright restraints on trade.236 The FTC currently has broader discretion to 
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adjudicate possible violations of section 5’s unfair competition language.237 
Application of section 5 of the FTC Act through FTC adjudication thus may still 
preserve a viable outlet for antitrust and unfair competition theories in the context 
of the transferability of FRAND commitments. However, the remedies available 
for FTC actions under section 5 are narrower than those available for violations of 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as we examine in more detail below. In the 
alternative, Speegle suggests that rulemaking under section 5 might prove 
beneficial to addressing issues that arise in the standards context.238 
b. Insufficiency of Antitrust to Address FRAND Problems 
In the standard-setting context, competition law has been one of the most visible 
aspects of the law governing these disputes. As noted above, however, the case law 
on antitrust issues indicates that this body of law may not be well suited for the 
current controversy. As is the case in other areas of ex-post adjudication, antitrust 
claims ultimately cannot be brought until an injury has already occurred, and any 
positive resolution for the injury must then wait until the conclusion of potentially 
protracted and complicated litigation. Thus, consumer injury may be magnified by 
the inherently ex-post nature of antitrust remedies.  
The nature of antitrust law in the United States is the primary reason why this 
area of law will not be sufficient to address FRAND problems. For a claim to be 
brought under the Sherman Act, the law typically requires a showing of specific 
intent to engage in anticompetitive behavior,239 and the existence of anticompetitive 
behavior is evaluated through a number of tests that each set very high bars. First, 
antitrust claims under the Sherman Act are dismissed if the court does not think 
that sufficient harm to competition has been alleged, which in the patent and 
standards context, typically requires a showing of harm to competition in general, 
not just harm to the alleged infringer.240 Second, as Rambus shows, a broad 
application of the principles of NYNEX to the standard-setting context can lead to a 
conclusion that harm to consumers arising from a party charging others more for 
access to the party’s lawful monopoly (e.g., a patent) might require a stronger 
showing to establish an anticompetitive harm that can be addressed under antitrust 
law.241 Third, under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the ability to raise antitrust 
issues in a counterclaim is severely impeded,242 so antitrust theories might not be 
helpful for supporting a counterclaim in a suit for patent infringement. There is also 
case law that suggests that relying on antitrust law for the transferability of FRAND 
commitments would not work, because as a default rule, the obligations under 
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antitrust law with respect to FRAND commitments would primarily apply to the 
party that makes the FRAND commitment and would not transfer to a successor in 
interest.243  
Claims brought under section 5 of the FTC Act, claiming “unfair methods of 
competition” or “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” may be more likely to 
succeed, but with lesser remedies than under the Sherman Act. In civil litigation 
brought under the Clayton Act, civil litigants may be able to obtain treble damages 
and attorney fees,244 and in FTC adjudication under the Sherman Act, a company 
may be fined or ordered to disgorge profits.245 In contrast, section 5 authorizes the 
FTC to grant orders requiring the violator to cease and desist from the found 
violations,246 but case law suggests that this “cease and desist” authority does not 
include the power to order the violator to pay restitution to injured parties.247 
Violation of a final order may result in a fine of up to $10,000 per violation, with 
federal district courts also being authorized to grant mandatory injunctions in the 
interest of enforcing the final order.248 While the possibility of injunctions to 
enforce FTC orders has promise in the SSO context, the threat of a $10,000 fine per 
violation may not have much bite. The $10,000 fine has been in the statute since 
1973,249 when $10,000 had the buying power of over $50,000 in 2012 dollars.250 
Though antitrust law is unlikely to assist in issues relating to the transfer of 
SEPs, the law of unfair competition may have promise for extending FRAND 
commitments to commercially essential patents and for applying the FRAND 
commitment to benefit nonmembers of the SSO. Applying European competition 
law, the European Commission (EC) recently examined the possibility of requiring 
owners to grant access to commercially essential technologies in the context of 
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evaluating Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility.251 There, the Commission 
noted that “in exceptional circumstances, notably where a technology has become 
an indispensable input for competitors, a refusal to grant access to that technology 
may be abusive.”252 However, the Commission’s opinion emphasized that this 
would be a fact-intensive inquiry.253 If policymakers decree that competitors should 
be granted access to commercially essential patents or face possible investigations, 
the policy could strike a balance between acknowledging this obligation and not 
imposing excessive liability on patent owners by limiting claims to redress under 
section 5 of the FTC Act.  
We also anticipate that antitrust law and the law of unfair competition could 
permit nonmembers of the SSO to benefit from the FRAND commitment. The 
focus of these areas of law is on the market as a whole rather than on specific 
parties to a contract.254 As the Dell adjudication shows, the FTC has been willing to 
require patent owners to agree to not assert their IP rights in a standard.255 Further 
clarification and analysis on this point may be beneficial, but it appears that a 
consent decree that is adopted in response to a patent owner’s refusal to negotiate 
for a license could require the patent owner to engage in good faith negotiations 
with potential licensees. 
We express doubts, however, that either antitrust law or the law of unfair 
competition would assist with the problems surrounding after-acquired patents in 
the United States. For after-acquired patents, we look to the reasoning of the 
Rambus and Vizio cases to conclude that antitrust law is not likely to apply to after-
acquired patents in the absence of a conspiracy to monopolize.256 If the SSO’s 
policy addresses after-acquired patents, this may make the problem capable of 
being redressed under contract law, but we do not think that such contract language 
would automatically affect the antitrust issues. Because of the importance of 
contracts in these disputes, we now turn to an examination of contract law. 
3. Contract 
Contract law is especially relevant to these disputes, because FRAND 
commitments are typically recognized as being valid contracts between the SSO 
and the patent owning member.257 The IPR policies of many SSOs say that, if the 
patent owner refuses to make a FRAND commitment, the SSO may decline to use 
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the patented technology in the standard. Lemley’s analysis suggests that a FRAND 
commitment that is part of an SSO’s bylaws becomes an enforceable contract when 
the SSO member accepts these terms of membership,258 but some SSOs specifically 
state that the SSO will not get involved with licensing disputes.259 If the FRAND 
commitment is a contract that is enforceable against the patent owner, and the SSO 
states that it will not get involved in licensing disputes, Merges and Kuhn note that 
this raises difficult questions relating to whom can enforce the contract and what 
the available remedies might be.260  
This Part focuses mostly on the application of formal contract law but also 
discusses the application of detrimental reliance. A detrimental reliance theory 
would be partially grounded in contract law, but the available remedies would be 
equitable rather than legal.261 
a. Contract Cases 
Because a FRAND commitment is typically viewed as a contract, much of the 
litigation in the FRAND commitment context focuses on formal contract law. The 
FRAND commitment is between the patent holder and the SSO, but does it really 
create a contract? When approaching these problems from a formal contract 
perspective, this is the threshold question. Fortunately, it is also a threshold 
question that has been repeatedly answered in the affirmative, at least when the 
question is whether the agreement creates a contract between the patent owner and 
the SSO.262 In Microsoft v. Motorola, the court concluded that a FRAND 
commitment is a valid contract, because the commitment involves an offer, an 
acceptance, and consideration.263 There, the court concluded that the SSO’s 
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promise to include or consider including the patent in the standard in exchange for 
the FRAND commitment was consideration.264 On an interlocutory appeal 
concerning a related injunction issued against Microsoft by a German court, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court’s characterization of a FRAND 
commitment as a valid contract was not legally erroneous.265 
So there is a valid contract, but the contract was created by an agreement 
between the patent owner and the SSO. If a patent owner violates the agreement, 
the SSO could sue as the other party to the contract, but the policies of many SSOs 
indicate that the SSO will not get involved in licensing disputes.266 If the SSO will 
not hold the patent owner liable for violating a FRAND commitment, who else 
can? What about the potential adopters of the standard? Do they have a claim 
against the patent owner for breach of contract? So far, under the law of the United 
States, the answer has been yes.267 The standard adopters are likely to be third-party 
beneficiaries under the contract, which means that they receive a direct benefit 
from the contract even though they are not a party to the contract.268 In the case of 
FRAND commitments, these contracts are specifically intended to benefit parties 
that want to adopt the standard, so there is a solid argument for these adopters 
being third-party beneficiaries. In Microsoft v. Motorola, the court specifically 
noted that Microsoft (a member of the SSO) was a third-party beneficiary of the 
FRAND commitments that Motorola made to the SSO.269 It would also lead to 
unjust results if a patent owner who makes a FRAND commitment was permitted 
to sue standard adopters for infringement, but the standard adopters were not 
allowed to rely on the FRAND commitment as part of their legal theory. However, 
this conclusion is not universal across all jurisdictions. German contract law, for 
instance, typically does not recognize third-party rights in a contract.270 
But many questions are still unresolved. So far, most of the litigation involving 
questions of third-party beneficiaries to a FRAND commitment has occurred in a 
context where the third-party beneficiary was a member of the SSO.271 Thus, case 
law is currently unclear as to whether a nonmember would be considered a 
third-party beneficiary, though there is at least one case where a court permitted a 
claim to proceed where a nonmember of the SSO in question sought to enforce a 
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FRAND commitment made by a patent owner and its predecessor-in-interest.272 In 
the ESS Technology case, the question of SSO membership did not figure into the 
analysis, which may indicate that protests based on the member-nonmember 
distinction are purely academic in nature.  
Lemley, however, warns that allowing nonmembers to enforce a FRAND 
commitment would make the public at large into third-party beneficiaries.273 In our 
view, nonmembers of the SSO who fall within the class of “standard adopters” 
should be eligible to enforce a FRAND commitment as a third-party beneficiary, 
because the class of “standard adopters” is a distinct class and is not the same thing 
as allowing the FRAND commitment to be enforced by the public at large. The 
patent owner would not be bound by the FRAND commitment in the case of all 
infringements, just infringements that involve use of the patented technology to 
comply with the standard. 
What does this contract create? In the case of Apple v. Samsung, the parties 
agreed that Samsung’s FRAND declaration to ETSI was a contract that at least 
created a duty for Samsung to negotiate licenses in good faith.274 In Microsoft v. 
Motorola, Motorola attempted to argue that the FRAND commitment imposes this 
duty to negotiate in good faith on the potential licensee, such that if the patent 
owner makes the first contact with the potential licensee, the obligation to license 
on FRAND terms is expunged.275 However, the court rejected this argument, 
reasoning that it would defeat the purpose of a FRAND promise if the patent owner 
could evade the obligation by making first contact.276 The court further rejected 
Motorola’s argument that Microsoft repudiated the FRAND commitment by filing 
suit against Motorola instead of negotiating for a license.277 In the court’s February 
27, 2012, ruling granting a partial summary judgment, the court opined that a 
potential licensee would not be repudiating an agreement if the potential licensee 
filed suit to request that a court determine whether terms comported with the 
FRAND commitment.278 This dicta was made official in the court’s June 6, 2012, 
ruling on separate summary judgment motions.279  
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If the SSO only requires the license to be granted on FRAND terms, is the 
patent owner obligated by the FRAND commitment to make an initial offer on 
FRAND terms? In Microsoft v. Motorola, the court said no, but ruled the initial 
offer “must comport with the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.”280 This 
reasoning suggests that negotiations for royalty payments must start at a point that 
is not so far from FRAND that it appears to be made in bad faith. There, 
Motorola’s initial offer to license the patent to Microsoft was at a 2.25% royalty per 
unit.281 By including the “good faith and fair dealing” language, the court retained 
the authority to review the propriety of the initial offer, without inserting new 
language into a contract that, on its face, only refers to the granted license and not 
the initial offer.282  
While a standard implementer might choose to sue for breach of contract due to 
an excessive initial royalty offer, a more likely scenario is that the parties might fail 
to reach an agreement after prolonged negotiations. The standard implementer 
might then file suit, claiming that by failing to reach an agreement, the patent 
owner breached the contract with the SSO. In one such case, the mobile phone 
companies Ericsson and Samsung sued each other after reaching a stalemate in an 
attempted renegotiation of a cross-license of SEPs.283 Both companies asserted that 
the other party’s failure to reach an agreement was a breach of contract of the 
FRAND promise that each made to ETSI.284 
If a FRAND commitment is construed as an enforceable contract, and the 
litigation continues to a final judgment, the court may be asked to determine a 
reasonable royalty under the contract. When analyzing the reasonable royalty 
question, some courts look to the 1970 case of Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. 
Plywood Corp., which set forth a very detailed fifteen-factor test for determining a 
reasonable royalty.285 The Georgia-Pacific factors, however, do not provide any 
guidance for calculating royalties, but only for determining whether proffered 
royalties are reasonable.286 In April 2013, Judge Robart of the Western District of 
Washington issued a 207-page decision in Microsoft v. Motorola, in what some are 
calling a landmark decision in FRAND commitments,287 where the court 
painstakingly goes through the most relevant Georgia-Pacific factors and several 
different theories to calculate royalties that would be consistent with Motorola’s 
FRAND obligations.288  
Sometimes, the reasonable royalty question is simplified by the existence of a 
number of other licenses for the same patent, but a court following the Georgia-
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Pacific factors may emphasize that the existence of comparable royalty 
arrangements is only part of the test.289 Because owning an SEP gives the owner a 
greater power in negotiations, courts have also discussed a reasonable royalty for 
an SEP as being guided by the royalty that the patent would have warranted on its 
own in the absence of the standard.290 This is also a position supported by the FTC 
in its recent Intellectual Property Marketplace Report, in which the FTC 
recommended capping royalties at the licensing value of the patent at the time the 
standard was defined.291 
b. Litigation over FRAND Commitments—Transferability 
While contract theories are pretty straightforward when the litigation focuses on 
the obligations of the party who made the promise, the topic gets muddled when the 
patent starts changing hands. As we noted above in the context of bankruptcy law, 
licenses are often an easier case than FRAND commitments.292 The same is true in 
theories based on formal contract principles. In Intel, Inc. v. Negotiated Data 
Solutions, LLC,293 the court held a 1976 license valid even though the patent had 
been assigned multiple times and had been granted reissue by the USPTO since the 
license was initially created.294 Similarly, in Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP v. 
AOL LLC,295 the current owner of the patent was found to be bound by the prior 
license agreement and subsequent sublicensing agreements.296 In that situation, 
both the patent and the license had been assigned multiple times.297  
FRAND commitments, however, are potentially more complicated, because they 
do not create a license, and instead only leave open the possibility for a license. In 
Rembrandt Technologies, LP v. Harris Corp., which we also discuss in Parts 
II.B.1.a and III.B.4, a Delaware court ran the gamut, and so did the litigants.298 
Harris sought a FRAND license from Rembrandt for the ‘627 patent, an HDTV-
related patent that was originally owned by AT&T.299 The same patent was also the 
subject of MDL in federal court, though Harris was not a party to that litigation.300 
Based on the terms of the FRAND commitment that AT&T entered into with the 
ATSC, the court initially granted Harris’s motion for partial summary judgment on 
the issue that Rembrandt, as AT&T’s successor in interest to the relevant patent, 
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owed Harris a FRAND license to essential patents.301 This ruling could potentially 
have helped standard adopters, but it quickly unraveled from there after a Markman 
hearing in the MDL suggested that the patent might be invalid, and the parties 
altered their theories in the Delaware proceeding accordingly.302 The Delaware 
court later vacated the earlier grant of partial summary judgment.303 Nonetheless, 
the court’s initial approach to the question of whether a successor in interest is 
bound by the previous owner’s FRAND commitment shows that courts may be 
receptive to contract-based arguments for the assignability of FRAND obligations, 
at least when, as here, the party seeking to enforce the FRAND commitment is a 
member of the SSO.304  
i. Transferability of FRAND Commitments in the EU 
Though the post-assignment status of FRAND commitments is unclear under 
U.S. law, the European Commission (EC) takes a much stronger position about 
FRAND commitments and the transferability of FRAND commitments pertaining 
to essential patents. The EC approach to transferability, however, is more likely to 
focus on competition law than on contract law.  
In 2001, the EC set out guidelines for applying European competition law to 
“horizontal cooperation agreements,” including SSOs.305 Specifically, paragraph 
174 of the guidelines specifies that when industry actors work together to create a 
standard, “access to the standard must be possible for third parties on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.”306 Paragraph 285 of the “Guidelines on 
the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements” duplicates this language, also 
adding a recommendation that the FRAND commitment be binding against 
assignees.307 In 2009, the EC reacted favorably to IPCom’s agreement to abide by 
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the FRAND commitment made by Bosch, its predecessor in interest to a number of 
SEPs.308  
As noted above, antitrust law in the United States takes a potentially more 
restrictive view of FRAND commitments than does European competition law. 
Thus, transferability of FRAND commitments under U.S. law currently turns on 
the application of contract law, with antitrust law largely not being as applicable. 
On the other hand, transferability of the same agreements in the EU will likely rely 
on European competition law, with some European jurisdictions taking a position 
against the third-party beneficiary theory that allows for viable FRAND 
commitment enforcement under the formal contract law of the United States.309 In 
our view, a property-based approach may serve to unify both the United States and 
the EC on the issue of FRAND commitment transferability. 
c. Formal Contract Law and the FRAND Problems 
Parties to a contract can generally agree to anything that doesn’t violate the law, 
isn’t contrary to public policy, and doesn’t render the contract so unfair as to be 
unconscionable.310 When a contract addresses all of the possible issues, and there is 
valid offer, acceptance, and consideration sufficient to support the formation of a 
contract, there would be no problem.311 However, there is currently no standard for 
standards—that is, SSOs vary significantly in how they address IP rights and 
FRAND commitments, and there are many things that may be left out of these 
agreements.  
The first problem that we introduced in the above Widget hypothetical 
concerned the enforceability of a FRAND commitment by a party who was not a 
member of the SSO. This issue will largely be influenced by the IPR policy of the 
SSO and is likely to be resolved under U.S. contract law by reference to the third-
party beneficiary doctrine. The FRAND commitment is typically recognized as 
being a valid contract, and the potential licensee is a third-party beneficiary of that 
contract. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that a party may be the 
intended beneficiary of a contract if the agreement indicates an intention to provide 
a right to the third party under the contract.312  
In our view, a FRAND commitment in which the patent holder agrees to license 
on FRAND terms to anyone who intends to implement the standard clearly creates 
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a category of intended beneficiary for all potential adopters of the standard. Thus, 
accepting that the agreement is a valid contract and that potential licensees are the 
intended beneficiaries under the contract, there is a good legal basis for potential 
licensees bringing suit in court to enforce a FRAND commitment, whether they are 
SSO members or not. However, Lemley expresses concern that this broad 
interpretation of “intended beneficiary” as including nonmembers may be 
impermissible under contract law in the absence of explicit language in the 
FRAND commitment.313 An SSO can address this ambiguity by inserting language 
indicating that the FRAND commitment is intended to benefit all potential standard 
adopters, including nonmembers. If the Widget SSO adopted such language, the 
fact that Widgecom was not a member of the Widget SSO would clearly not 
prevent it from enforcing the FRAND commitment against parties who are 
otherwise bound by it.  
Jurisdiction raises another potential conflict. As noted above, European courts 
may not be as receptive to third-party beneficiary arguments as U.S. courts. Faced 
with the inability of standard adopters to enforce the FRAND commitments as 
third-party beneficiaries, some SSOs may need to reconsider their current policies 
against getting involved in licensing disputes, because otherwise the parties that are 
the intended beneficiaries of FRAND commitments may not have the standing to 
enforce these commitments. 
Problem 2b of the hypothetical raises the issue of after-acquired patents. 
Assume that Gizmo Inc. promised in 2010 to license patents on FRAND terms to 
adopters of the Widget standard, back when the only relevant patent held by Gizmo 
Inc. was the five-inch Widget-1A patent. In 2011, Gizmo Inc. obtained Doodad 
LLC’s patent on the Widget-3 technology. Assuming that the FRAND commitment 
applies equally to “core” essential and “noncore” essential patents, can Widgetech 
and Widgecom demand the ability to negotiate for a FRAND license to the Widget-
3 patent as well as the Widget-1A patent? This question of after-acquired patents is 
another issue that an SSO could address in advance in its IPR policy.  
Of all of the options that we consider in this Article, contract law is probably the 
best suited to address the problem of after-acquired patents. Contract terms that 
create an interest in after-acquired property are not new to the law: commercial 
contract law and the UCC already address the issue of interests in after-acquired 
property.314 Specifically, Article 9 of the UCC allows for the creation of security 
interests in after-acquired collateral, for example, if a small retail business obtained 
a loan from a bank, and in exchange for this loan, the business owner granted the 
bank a security interest in present and after-acquired inventory.315 
Security interests and FRAND commitments are similar to each other in a 
number of ways. First, both are promises relating to something that may not exist 
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yet, and these promises are being offered as consideration for something desirable. 
With security interests, the promise is that the entity that makes a loan will have 
protection in the event that the borrower defaults.316 When a patent owner enters 
into an agreement with an SSO to license its patent on FRAND terms, this is often 
as a condition of the patent’s claims being adopted as part of the standard. The 
patents of mechanical devices are often not worth much on their own except as part 
of a larger product that relies on several technologies, but when a standard relies on 
a particular patent, that patent owner can then expect an increase in the demand for 
licenses.  
Second, neither a security interest nor a FRAND commitment is a concrete 
thing, and neither would line up perfectly with contract law in the absence of 
specific provisions. If after-acquired collateral were not already an accepted 
premise in the law of secured transactions, loan terms allowing a lender to claim as 
yet undefined collateral might be argued as being vague and unenforceable under 
contract law. Similarly, a FRAND commitment to license as-yet-unacquired patents 
to undisclosed parties on undisclosed terms may lead to arguments from patent 
owners that the FRAND commitment is too vague to be an enforceable contract. 
This argument for unenforceability is likely to fail, because the modern rule of 
contract law permits parties to leave some terms subject to future determination, 
such as references to a “reasonable market price.”317 
Analogizing FRAND commitments to security interests is instructive in another 
way as well. The after-acquired collateral provisions of Article 9 can be fairly 
viewed as a legislative approach to addressing a problem that was faced by 
commercial lenders prior to the enactment of Article 9. These provisions aided in 
the development of the commercial lending industry in the middle of the twentieth 
century.318 Thus, to the extent that the desire to apply FRAND commitments to 
after-acquired patents can be analogized to security interests, this analogy suggests 
that legislative intervention may be advisable, rather than pure reliance on common 
law approaches. 
FRAND commitment transferability, however, remains problematic. Contract 
law focuses on mutual assent to contract terms,319 so in order for the FRAND 
commitment to apply to PatBuy, Inc., PatBuy would have to have agreed to be 
bound by this prior agreement. The current solution to the FRAND commitment 
transferability problem is for SSOs to address the transferability of the agreement 
in the initial contract with the patent owner. If the Widget SSO stated in its IPR 
policy that transfers must be made subject to the FRAND commitment, the focus 
would be on whether HF Gadget obtained the required consent to be bound. 
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However, it is unclear what the proper recourse would be if a patent owner violated 
the terms of the SSO’s bylaws by failing to secure the assignee’s consent to be 
bound by the agreement. There may be a possibility of the implementers or the 
SSO holding the original patent owner liable for failure to abide by these terms, but 
even if damages could be obtained from the original patent owner, the 
implementers could not likely use the previous patent owner’s breach to compel a 
license from the current owner. In Part I.F.1, we discuss the differing approaches of 
four SSOs to the issue of FRAND commitment transferability.  
With the exception of the patent transfer issue, the four main issues that we 
raised in the Widget hypothetical could be resolved through contract language as 
long as the language was not excessively broad or unreasonable. SSOs could 
impose a requirement that SEPs be transferred subject to the FRAND commitment 
made by the prior owner, but a breach of this term by the assignor likely could not 
be held against the assignee. The SSO could also make it explicit that the FRAND 
commitment is a promise to license on FRAND terms to all adopters of the 
standard, not just adopters who are also members of the SSO. The SSO could also 
include a provision addressing the after-acquired problem, explicitly stating that the 
FRAND commitment also applied to SEPs that the agreeing party obtained after 
entering into the agreement. Finally, the SSO could clarify whether the term 
“standard essential patent” includes core essential patents, noncore essential 
patents, and commercially essential patents. If the SSO considers commercially 
essential patents to be SEPs, the SSO should further clarify whether it is adopting a 
broad, intermediate, or narrow definition of commercial essentiality. 
But to what end? Recent analysis of FRAND commitments has treated the 
commitment as a kind of affirmative defense to infringement, limiting the remedies 
available to the patent owner.320 Thus, in Part IV, we examine the options that a 
court might consider when determining the appropriate remedy for infringement of 
an SEP. For the purposes of this Part, we note that the typical contract damages of 
expectation and reliance damages are likely to be difficult to calculate in the 
standards context, and even if a value was determined, pure money damages are 
likely to be less attractive than requiring the patent owner to grant a license 
permitting the contract beneficiary to manufacture a product and compete in the 
relevant market.  
d. Applying Detrimental Reliance to the FRAND Problems 
Sometimes, the law of formal contracts will not be effective. While the 
third-party beneficiary doctrine may protect standard adopters as the intended 
beneficiaries of a FRAND commitment, and the law of security interests provides 
helpful guidance for dealing with after-acquired patents, there are still gaps that 
formal contract law does not fill. For that reason, scholars like Lemley, Merges, 
and Kuhn have suggested turning to an estoppel argument to permit standard 
adopters to argue that they relied to their detriment on the patent owner’s assertion 
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that it would license on FRAND terms.321 A theory of detrimental reliance would 
focus on whether a specific agreement is binding against other entities outside the 
four corners of the agreement because of the expectation that the agreement creates 
for third parties.322 Contreras suggests that a detrimental reliance theory would be 
more helpful than formal contract theory when addressing FRAND commitment 
issues.323 
Detrimental reliance is often discussed in the context of implied licenses and 
equitable estoppel defenses in patent law,324 but for the purposes of this Part, we are 
viewing detrimental reliance as an alternative to formal contract law. A detrimental 
reliance theory is likely to be more helpful than a formal contract theory in the case 
of patent transfers. Under formal contract law, the FRAND commitment would 
likely have to be accepted by the assignee for the agreement to be binding after the 
patent is transferred. On the other hand, a detrimental reliance theory is focused on 
the standard adopter’s investments in reliance on the availability of a license.325 In 
this situation, the standard adopter is fully willing to pay the cost of licensing, but 
in the interest of competition, may feel pressured to adopt the standard prior to 
solidifying a licensing agreement.  
However, detrimental reliance is not perfect either. First, as Mueller notes, it 
may not be reasonable for parties who are not members of the SSO to rely on a 
patent owner’s promise to the SSO.326 In terms of addressing the problem of 
whether the FRAND commitment binds subsequent owners, detrimental reliance 
may suffer from the same drawbacks as equitable estoppel and implied licenses as 
defenses under patent law because the assignee may have made no representations 
concerning licensing. And even if the detrimental reliance theory is effective at 
addressing some SEP licensing problems, it is unclear if the same theory could 
apply to noncore essential patents, commercially essential patents, or after-acquired 
patents. Detrimental reliance is also not likely to assist in the case of after-acquired 
patents unless the previous owner made a FRAND commitment to the same SSO 
concerning that patent. 
Ultimately, neither formal contract law nor detrimental reliance effectively 
addresses all of the primary problems that threaten to arise in the context of 
FRAND commitments. Contract law may assist with several of the problems, but it 
contains no legal tools to enable a FRAND commitment to be binding against 
subsequent assignees in the absence of the assignee giving explicit consent to be 
bound. Considering how often patents are transferred, this threatens to reduce 
FRAND commitments to a meaningless formality that can be enforced against no 
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one. At the most basic level of contract law, it does not seem like this would be a 
fair reading of the FRAND commitment, because an SSO would likely not require 
members to make a commitment that the SSO did not intend to have legal force. 
But the nature of contract law also would prevent a FRAND commitment from 
transferring to a subsequent assignee unless the assignee agrees to be bound by the 
commitment. During the development of a standard, if an SSO member refuses to 
make a FRAND commitment, the SSO will typically adopt an alternative 
technology and bypass the technology of the refusing member. An SSO that has 
already adopted a standard and now faces an assignee that refuses to commit to 
FRAND licensing has encountered a much bigger problem, because an entire 
industry may now be locked in to the version of the standard that includes the 
assignee’s patent. 
Thus, we propose a fourth option for analyzing FRAND commitment problems: 
examining these problems through the lens of property law and servitudes, based 
on the theory that the FRAND commitment creates an encumbrance on the patent.  
4. Property 
As discussed above, there are a number of fundamental flaws with relying on 
patent law, antitrust law, and contract law to address problems that might occur in 
the standards context. A final body of law that could potentially apply to these 
situations, though there has been no discussion of this option up to this point, is 
property law. While the question of FRAND commitments has not been addressed 
using a property theory, there is growing literature asserting that intellectual 
property licenses are analogous to traditional property rights.327 These arguments 
typically run counter to the traditional view of licensing as creating only a contract 
promising that the licensor will not sue the licensee for the licensee’s use of the 
intellectual property.328 In the following Part, we argue that, like licenses, 
commitments to license have traits that resemble property interests. Both licenses 
and commitments to license create an encumbrance on the intellectual property 
owner’s right to exclude. The biggest difference between the two is the identity of 
the beneficiary. With licenses, it is clear who is favored by that encumbrance. With 
commitments to license, on the other hand, the encumbrance is the IP owner’s 
commitment to be open to future license negotiations and to not refuse to negotiate 
with parties entitled to seek a license. 
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In Part III, we examine the possibility that the law of real property can offer some 
useful analogies to buttress arguments that FRAND commitments “run with the 
patent.” For example, by treating FRAND commitments like servitudes, the main 
issue would become whether the assignee had notice of the agreement, rather than 
whether the predecessor in interest secured a commitment from the assignee to be 
bound by the agreement. It is to this new characterization of FRAND commitments 
that we now turn. 
III. FRAND COMMITMENTS AND THE LAW OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY 
“No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, 
and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most 
necessary to the establishment of human society . . . .”329  
Patents have aspects that resemble several different areas of law. Under U.S. 
patent law, patents are deemed to “have the attributes of personal property.”330 When 
a patent owner grants a license to another party, the license is often analyzed as a 
contract.331 Patent law also has flavors of tort law, with patent infringement claims 
being based on principles of strict liability.332 We noted above that there is currently a 
debate about the extent to which patent licenses should be viewed as property 
interests instead of purely as creations of contract. In our view, this argument has 
merit, but we view the property and contract traits of patent law as being interrelated, 
rather than a strict either/or matter. Contracts and property are not as independent of 
each other as the first year law school curriculum might suggest. As Newman 
observes, some typical contract language, like “title shall pass upon delivery,” 
focuses on legal consequences under property law and is impossible to breach.333  
A FRAND commitment is an enforceable contract, but it is also an enforceable 
contract that pertains to the treatment of intellectual property. While patents are 
statutorily decreed to have the attributes of personal property,334 Mossoff argues that 
historically, patents were treated as having attributes of both real property and 
personal property.335 It therefore might be instructive to analogize to real property in 
the case of standards and patent transfers. With real property, promises to do or not 
do something with the property may “run with the land.”336 In light of the importance 
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of FRAND commitments for facilitating the adoption of new technology standards, we 
view it as reasonable to argue that FRAND commitments should “run with the patent.” 
Ultimately, however, intellectual property is a sui generis construction,337 and 
direct analogies may not always be accurate. While drawing comparisons to other 
types of property may be helpful, Menell warns there are still important distinctions 
between patents and tangible property.338 For instance, unlike land or personal 
property, a patent is nonrivalrous and thus can be used by many people at once. This 
fundamental distinction contributes to the difference between the more formalistic 
approaches to tangible property and the more flexible approaches to intellectual 
property.339 However, some property rights scholars argue that intellectual property 
rights share the same functionalist policy concerns as tangible property rights.340 
Mossoff found that an examination of legal history supports this view and argues that 
nineteenth century patent law in the United States reflects a judicial approach to 
patents that was much more similar to property law approaches than modern theorists 
believe.341  
A. Analyzing a Property Approach to FRAND Commitments 
Because we view a FRAND commitment as a prelude to a license, we begin this 
Part with a discussion of how property theory has been applied to licenses, before 
treading into more theoretical grounds with discussions of the property-contract 
interface, informed by insights from the work of Hohfeld and more contemporary 
scholars like Merrill and Smith. 
1. Licenses as Property 
Newman, a proponent of the property theory of IP licenses, acknowledges that 
licenses have traits of a contract and are often granted as part of a contractual 
relationship, but also observes that a license shapes the allocation of resources, which 
is a fundamental concern of property.342 Some argue that a license should be viewed as 
a contract, not a property interest, based on the idea that a license is a “covenant not to 
sue.”343 As Newman critically observes, this argument, at its core, relies on a view 
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that what the licensee is doing constitutes trespass or infringement and is only 
permitted because the licensor made a promise beforehand not to sue the 
licensee.344 After all, if the action of the licensee was not still a violation of the 
licensor’s rights, a promise not to sue would be unnecessary. Thus, asserting that a 
license is a promise not to sue implicitly assumes that a license contract does not 
create a privilege to use the licensed property,345 which is not logically sound. 
Newman argues that this approach is also not reconcilable with the aspect of 
copyright law that allows multiple co-owners the power to grant nonexclusive 
licenses without obtaining the consent of the other owners,346 or with the fact that 
revocable licenses can be created without contract formalities.347 
The idea that a patent license is a “covenant not to sue” is a very old one that 
represents the view of federal courts for over a century.348 However, this does not 
mean that courts view patent licenses as purely creatures of contract. This position 
is based on an even older view of patents themselves: that obtaining a patent does 
not give the owner a right to practice the invention, but instead gives the owner a 
right to exclude everyone else from practicing the invention without the owner’s 
permission.349 The patent is thus a “right against the world,” like other property 
rights.350 An assignment of a patent involves a full transfer of this right, whereas a 
patent license involves transfer of a lesser interest.351 As Mossoff’s research shows, 
patent case law in the United States has long recognized that patentees could 
convey lesser interests in the patent and that the recipient of these lesser interests 
may be liable if they exceed the scope of these interests.352 Newman observes that 
as a legal instrument that permits use of a resource in a way that would otherwise 
be a trespass, a license can thus be understood as a use privilege similar to other 
recognized property interests.353 Thus, even if patent licenses are viewed as 
covenants not to sue, this does not prevent the license from also being a property 
interest.  
This Part extends this reasoning to FRAND commitments, arguing that FRAND 
commitments can be characterized as contractually created property interests in 
covered patents. We noted above that a patent license may be viewed as creating a 
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use privilege. However, a FRAND commitment cannot be said to do the same 
thing. On the other hand, a FRAND commitment could fairly be categorized as 
creating a negotiation right to benefit the adopters of the standard, with the patent 
owner retaining a duty to not refuse to negotiate. A FRAND commitment is not a 
license, but when a patent owner makes a FRAND commitment, we argue that this 
acts as a conditional covenant not to sue, whereby the patent owner promises to not 
sue standard implementers for infringement unless and until good faith attempts at 
negotiation fail. 
2. Hohfeldian Approaches to Jural Relations and the Intersection of Property and 
Contract 
Even though the career of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was short, he nonetheless 
made lasting contributions to the way that the language and philosophy of law are 
understood. Hohfeld’s 1913 article, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, sets forth a helpful guide for describing legal 
relations.354 This hundred-year-old article is so widely read and referenced that it 
landed a spot at number fifty in Shapiro and Pearse’s recent study ranking the one 
hundred most-cited law review articles.355  
In his article, Hohfeld abandons an attempt at formally defining each term and 
focuses on defining the terms as they relate to each other, emphasizing the relations 
between the concepts of rights, no-rights, privileges, powers, immunities, duties, 
disabilities, and liabilities.356 Hohfeld noted that the term “right” is often used 
broadly to refer to privileges, powers, and immunities, but he emphasizes that these 
ideas should be understood separately.357 Hohfeld pairs these eight concepts and 
indicates which are jural opposites of each other, and which are jural correlatives of 
each other.358 The jural opposite pairs are rights and no-rights, privilege and duty, 
power and disability, and immunity and liability; the jural correlative pairs are 
rights and duty, privilege and no-right, power and liability, and immunity and 
disability.359  
To say that rights and duties are jural correlatives of each other is to say that 
invading a right inherently involves the violation of a duty.360 Thus, a patent that 
gives its owner a right of exclusivity imposes on all others a duty to not infringe the 
patent. To say that duty and privilege are jural opposites of each other is to say that 
the privilege of doing a specific action negates the duty to not do a specific 
action.361 If a patent licensee has a privilege to use the licensed patent, this indicates 
that the licensee has no duty to refrain from using the patent. Rights and privileges 
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are also related, in the sense that a right indicates an affirmative claim against 
another, whereas a privilege indicates “freedom from the right or claim of 
another.”362 Analogously, the word power is generally used to indicate that one 
person has affirmative control of a particular legal relation, whereas immunity 
indicates that one person has freedom from the control that another might otherwise 
exercise over a particular legal relation.363 Yaniv Heled notes, however, that having 
immunity from the power of another does not imply that a right to act has been 
conferred.364 
Newman notes that under traditional property law, a property owner can create 
use privileges, such as easements or licenses, and bestow these use privileges on 
another while otherwise retaining full ownership of the property.365 If A gives a use 
privilege to B that allows B to cross A’s land, this suggests that A has no right to 
interfere with B’s exercise of his use privilege. Use privileges can either be 
revocable or irrevocable.366 Let us again assume that A grants a use privilege to B. 
If A declares that B’s use privilege is irrevocable, this will generally mean that if A 
assigns his full interest in the property to C, then C will have no right to interfere 
with B’s existing use privilege.367 However, use privileges are likely not 
irrevocable unless the property owner states that they are.368 In Hohfeldian terms, 
an irrevocable license may be understood as granting the licensee immunity from 
revocation,369 which is the same thing as saying that the licensor has no power to 
revoke the license.370  
By the license itself being a use privilege, this suggests that the licensee obtains 
a privilege to use the property, whereas the property owner has a no-right and 
cannot prevent the use by the licensee.371 An irrevocable patent license thus creates 
a use privilege, and the patent owner has no right to interfere with the licensee’s 
use. The FRAND commitment may be understood as imposing on the patent owner 
a duty to negotiate in good faith,372 and through Hohfeldian analysis, this means 
that there is a correlative right to good faith negotiation that is held by the potential 
licensee. Thus, an irrevocable license creates a use privilege with which the patent 
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owner has no right to interfere, and a FRAND commitment bestows on the standard 
adopter a right to negotiate that the patent owner has a duty to recognize. 
Having established that the FRAND commitment creates a right for the benefit 
of the potential licensee, we turn next to the characterization of this right. In a later 
article, Hohfeld recognizes two categories of rights: in rem and in personam.373 A 
conclusion that FRAND commitments create an in personam right would be 
consistent with a conclusion that contract law should govern, while a conclusion 
that FRAND commitments create an in rem right would be consistent with a 
conclusion that property law should govern.  
Hohfeld refers to in personam rights as “paucital rights” and to in rem rights as 
“multital rights.”374 Merrill and Smith provide a very helpful and detailed analysis 
of Hohfeld’s discussion of in rem and in personam rights and the overlap between 
these ideas in the modern context.375 Rights in rem may pertain to tangible objects, 
but they may also pertain to intangibles, like patents or a right to privacy.376 Rights 
that are in rem are typically viewed as being binding against the rest of the world, 
creating negative obligations that prevent everyone else from taking particular 
actions.377 Rights that are in personam are typically viewed as being binding 
against only definite parties, creating affirmative obligations that require the 
specified parties to take affirmative actions.378 In rem rights are generally 
associated with a limited number of forms that the rights can take, while in 
personam rights are associated with flexibility and default rules.379 In personam 
rights impose a large informational burden on a small class of actors with very little 
effect on third parties, while the exclusion strategy of in rem rights imposes the 
informational burden on a large, undefined class.380  
To mitigate the harmful effects of the informational burdens, Merrill and Smith 
note that the law typically uses either a notice strategy or a protection strategy.381 A 
notice strategy focuses on facilitating the generation of information about the 
relation, while a protection strategy involves specific legal interventions, like 
default rules, designed to favor the uninformed party.382 Merrill and Smith suggest 
that notice and protection strategies could be permitted to overlap, such as in the 
case of a notice strategy that includes a penalty default rule favoring the 
nontransferring party if there is a failure to disclose.383 Merrill and Smith’s analysis 
suggests that notice strategies would be appropriate when the information can be 
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produced in a cost effective manner, while protection strategies would be 
appropriate when information production would not be cost effective.384  
Notice and protection strategies can already be seen in the private governance 
structures of SSOs. Many SSOs, for example, require members to disclose essential 
patents that the members own.385 The disclosure rule acts as a notice strategy that 
aims to put adopters on notice of the rights of others. Some SSOs also make 
records of FRAND commitments publicly available.386 In the case of IEEE-SA, the 
member’s Letter of Assurance concerning IP rights is posted on the organization’s 
website, thus serving a notice function.387 Some SSOs, such as VITA, go further 
and specify that a member who fails to disclose an SEP would then be required to 
license that patent on a FRAND-RF basis.388 This type of FRAND-RF rule could be 
fairly characterized as a protection strategy that favors the party who has an 
informational disadvantage. 
FRAND commitments thus can be addressed through a combination of notice 
and protection strategies. As we examine below, there are many examples of 
instances where FRAND commitments behave like contract interests and property 
interests. This overlap is consistent with the theories of Merrill and Smith, who 
observe that some legal situations can be purely in rem, others purely in personam, 
but that some demonstrate a mixture of the two concepts.389 Merrill and Smith thus 
propose that there are four primary categories of rights: pure paucital rights, 
compound-paucital rights, quasi-multital rights, and pure multital rights.390 As 
discussed above, in personam, or paucital rights, avail against singular identified 
persons, while in rem, or multital rights, avail against numerous unidentified 
persons.  
These two factors, numerosity and identification, also combine into two other 
possible intermediate characterizations. Merrill and Smith view compound-paucital 
rights as availing against numerous identified persons, whereas quasi-multital 
rights avail against singular, unidentified persons.391 According to Merrill and 
Smith, an example of a compound-paucital situation is a standard form contract, 
where the possible people bound by the agreement are numerous and definite; and 
an example of a quasi-multital situation is an assignment of interest, where the 
possible people bound by the agreement are nonnumerous but indefinite.392 Even 
though “in personam” and “contract” are not synonyms, nor are “in rem” and 
“property” synonyms, for our purposes, we consider compound-paucital rights to 
be “contract with property traits” and quasi-multital rights to be “property with 
contract traits.”  
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Merrill and Smith’s characterization of intermediate rights in the property-
contract interface has proved very important in developing our own theory for 
characterizing FRAND commitments, which we quickly recognized were creations 
neither purely of contract nor purely of property. In the study by Merrill and Smith, 
the authors examined four separate areas of law that cannot be clearly characterized 
as purely in rem or purely in personam: bailments, landlord-tenant law, security 
interests, and trusts.393 In our view, the treatment of patents in the standard-setting 
context is a fifth area where the rights cannot be characterized as solely in rem or 
solely in personam. When a patent is declared essential to a standard, the patent 
owner has in rem rights which the law must protect against a large and indefinite 
class of potential infringers, and all of the adopters of the standards have a duty to 
respect the IP rights of those who own SEPs. When a patent owner enters into a 
license with a standard adopter, this creates an in personam relation with 
affirmative obligations exchanged between defined parties.  
We argue that a FRAND commitment also has traits of both property and 
contract. By promising to license SEPs on FRAND terms to eligible parties, a 
patent owner takes on specific duties with regard to a large, undefined class of 
standards adopters. In other words, the right created by the FRAND commitment 
avails against a singular, identified person. This makes the FRAND commitment 
seem like an instrument that creates in personam rights. But unlike a typical in 
personam situation, where both sides of the agreement are identified, FRAND 
commitments involve a singular, identified party who has a duty under the 
commitment and a numerous class of unidentified parties who have a right under 
the commitment.  
This facet prevents FRAND commitments from fitting easily into either 
Hohfeld’s primary categories or Merrill and Smith’s intermediate categories. 
Merrill and Smith arrive at their intermediate categories by characterizing 
Hohfeld’s approach as focusing on the numerosity of duty holders and the 
definiteness of duty holders.394 It may thus be helpful to add two more categories to 
the theoretical approach of Merrill and Smith: numerosity and definiteness of the 
right holders. In a typical in rem relation, the right holder will be nonnumerous and 
definite, while the duty holder will be numerous and indefinite. A FRAND 
commitment is a reversal of this, with a nonnumerous and definite duty holder, and 
a numerous and indefinite class of right holders. We argue that this gives the 
FRAND commitment itself some qualities of both property and contract.  
The intermediate nature of the FRAND commitment is especially apparent when 
a patent, which is subject to a FRAND commitment, is then transferred. In that 
case, the patent owner against whom these rights may be asserted is unknown, 
giving the transfer traits of a quasi-multital relation. The class of potential licensees 
still has a negotiation right, but the right now avails against a singular, unidentified 
person. To protect FRAND commitments when patents are transferred, either a 
notice or protection strategy may be appropriate. In the case of patent transfers, a 
notice regime that provides for mandatory recordation of assignments might be 
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effective at reducing the informational burden when the potential licensees must 
determine the current owner of an essential patent. 
In this Part, we have taken the view of a license as a use privilege and extended it 
to conclude that a FRAND commitment is a negotiation right. This right creates a 
corresponding duty to not interfere with the authorized activity. The FRAND 
commitment can either be characterized as a contract with property traits or as 
property with contract traits. Building on the theories of Hohfeld and the work of 
Merrill and Smith, we argue that under some circumstances it is appropriate to take a 
property-based approach to FRAND commitments and patent transfer issues in the 
standards context. As this Part shows, viewing FRAND commitments through the 
lens of property interests is part of a logical progression building on work concerning 
the intersection of property and contract. Having established the theoretical 
underpinnings, we turn now to the more concrete application of the law of servitudes. 
B. Analogizing to the Law of Servitudes 
There are several defined interests in real property law, including fee simple 
estates, life estates, and leaseholds.395 In addition to these, parties can make land use 
arrangements based on private agreements, and these arrangements can result in the 
creation of servitudes.396 Servitudes are nonpossessory property interests by which 
the holder gains a right in an asset, and servitudes are generally enforceable against 
successors in interest, provided the successor has notice of the servitude.397  
There are four general categories of servitudes: easements, profits, licenses, and 
covenants.398 Covenants can either be real covenants or equitable servitudes, 
depending on how they are enforced, but the Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes indicates that there is no longer a significant difference between real 
covenants and equitable servitudes.399 Equitable servitudes arose under English 
common law. Analysis often traces their development to Tulk v. Moxhay,400 an 1848 
case concerning an encumbrance on a lot in Leicester Square, where the Chancery 
Court concluded that the prior restrictions ran with the land, provided the subsequent 
purchaser had notice of these restrictions.401 
A servitude can be characterized as having a benefited party and a burdened 
party.402 For the benefit to run under the common law test, the party had to 
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establish intent that the benefit would run to successors and that the agreement 
“touche[d] and concern[ed]” the land.403 For the burden to run, the party had to 
establish intent that the burden would run, that the agreement “touched and 
concerned” the land, and that the burdened party was on notice of the interest.404 
Under the traditional rule for whether an agreement touches and concerns the land, 
such a promise would need to relate to the use of the land.405 However, the current 
Restatement discards the concept of “touch and concern,” instead saying that 
servitudes are valid unless illegal, unconstitutional, or contrary to public policy.406  
In our view, it is fairly uncontroversial to conclude that a FRAND commitment 
relates to the use of the patent. A FRAND commitment that leads to a license 
clearly relates to the benefited licensee’s use of the patent. Similarly, the burden 
created by a FRAND commitment also relates to the use of the patent, because the 
FRAND commitment restricts the owner’s ability to exclude others from practicing 
the invention. As discussed above, using the patent to exclude others from 
practicing the invention is a fundamental right of patent ownership.407 Thus, a 
FRAND commitment touches and concerns the patent, so even if a court applies 
the common law “touch and concern” test, rather than the Restatement’s less 
restrictive standard, a FRAND commitment will satisfy the analysis. 
For a FRAND commitment to be a valid servitude that will run with the patent, 
the assignee must also have notice of the FRAND commitment. This is another 
aspect that we think will prove to be uncontroversial. Standards documents are 
publicly available, and many SSOs also make FRAND commitments publicly 
available.408 Professionals who work in the ICT industries, especially those whose 
work implicates standards, will likely know about these standards and 
commitments because of their work. Because the issues here will primarily relate to 
publicly available standards, the notice requirement will be quite easily satisfied. 
Thus, if the patent is assigned to an entity that is a participant in the market for the 
products that rely on the patent, the assignee should be held to have notice of the 
FRAND commitment and the corresponding servitude. 
The primary hurdle to analogizing to servitudes is that patents are treated as 
having the attributes of personal property, and servitudes on personal property are 
generally disfavored in the law,409 though Van Houweling argues that such 
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servitudes may be permissible.410 Van Houweling notes that the law of servitudes has 
become more liberalized over the years, though this liberalization has primarily 
focused on servitudes in real property.411 When cases have considered servitudes on 
personal property, such as use restrictions, these cases have often been analyzed 
under competition law.412 There have also been use restriction cases focusing on IP 
rights that emphasized the first sale doctrine of copyright law and the exhaustion 
doctrine of patent law.413 Van Houweling’s work focuses on use restrictions in items 
embodying IP to argue that the liberalization of servitudes should apply to personal 
property, specifically in the case of end user licensing agreements (EULAs).414 We 
argue that Van Houweling’s reasoning can also be extended to the negotiation rights 
that we propose are created by FRAND commitments.415 Compared to Van 
Houweling’s argument for viewing EULAs as creating servitudes, the informational 
burden is likely less significant if FRAND commitments are viewed as creating a 
servitude-like interest that runs with the patent, because patent licensees and 
assignees arguably already have more incentive to read contract terms than individual 
purchasers of consumer software.  
A servitude theory of FRAND commitments would also assist in addressing 
problems that might arise in the bankruptcy context. Under the Restatement (Third) of 
Property, servitudes are explicitly noted as not being dischargeable in bankruptcy.416 
Viewing FRAND commitments as creating servitudes thus helps fill in a gap within 
bankruptcy law. Current bankruptcy law gives a licensee the power to elect to retain 
their license,417 but a FRAND commitment would likely be treated as less than a 
license unless the bankruptcy court explicitly states otherwise, as in the case of Nortel 
Networks.418 If the commitment is treated as creating a servitude, a FRAND 
commitment may more easily survive bankruptcy without extra steps being required 
of the bankruptcy court. 
One last general advantage that should be noted for a servitude theory is the 
available remedy. By applying property law, the possibility of specific performance 
becomes viable for holders of the FRAND commitment-derived negotiation right.419 
                                                                                                                 
 
 410. See id. at 888–89. 
 411. Id. at 897. 
 412. See id. at 908–09 (discussing cases about conditions placed on consumer products).  
 413. Id. at 910–12. 
 414. Id. at 927. 
 415. However, the IP servitudes that Van Houweling’s work focused on are typically in 
the context of restrictions being placed on patented items that are sold, not the sale of patents 
themselves. Thus, while Van Houweling’s work and her reasoning are instructive, the ideas 
behind patent exhaustion and the legality of conditional sales of patented items are relevant 
but are ultimately very different from the FRAND commitment issues. The importance of 
the transferability of FRAND commitments is a matter of symmetry and equity, not a matter 
of a property owner exercising continued control over the final product.  
 416. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.9 (2000). 
 417. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006). 
 418. In re Nortel Networks, Inc., No. 09-10138(KG), 2011 WL 4831218, at *9 (Bankr. 
D. Del. July 11, 2011). 
 419. Andrew Russell, Comment, The Tenth Anniversary of the Restatement (Third) of 
Property, Servitudes: A Progress Report, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 753, 757 (2011) (discussing 
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This specific performance, however, does not require the patent owner to grant a 
license immediately, but rather requires the patent owner to give the holder of the 
negotiation right the opportunity to negotiate for a license that meets specified 
parameters. Thus, the remedy for a violation of the FRAND commitment is that the 
patent owner cannot play the patent holdout game. The fact that this specific 
performance will end with the holder of the negotiation right paying royalties to the 
patent holder does not matter in our view. It is often the case that servitudes in real 
property are acquired through purchase, sometimes through recurring payments.420 
As we noted above, other areas of law do not seem to fully address some of the 
legal issues that are raised by FRAND commitments. If we analogize FRAND 
commitments to creating entitlements similar to those created under the law of 
servitudes, this greatly simplifies the issue of FRAND commitment transferability, 
though application of contract law principles for the other FRAND problems is 
likely still desirable. 
1. Servitudes and Transfers 
The most significant effect of adopting a servitude theory is that it would make 
it clear that, as a negotiation right that is partially in rem, FRAND commitments 
run with the patent. We begin this analysis with further discussion of benefits and 
burdens.  
The law of servitudes focuses on benefits and burdens that are either 
appurtenant or in gross. To say that a burden or benefit is “appurtenant” means that 
it is “tied to ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land.”421 A 
burden or benefit that is “in gross,” on the other hand, is not tied to such ownership 
or occupancy.422 The law of servitudes allows an appurtenant benefit or burden to 
transfer automatically with the property interest.423 For example, if a large parcel of 
land is subdivided into multiple lots, only one of which faces the main road, an 
appurtenant easement will likely be created by the landowners, who will then 
construct a driveway perpendicular to the main road to reach the back lots. This 
appurtenant easement would thus give access to the main road to owners of lots 
that are not adjacent to the road by creating a right of way across parcels owned by 
others. According to the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, benefits in 
gross were historically prohibited, as were benefits created in third parties.424 
However, the rule set forth in the Restatement permits both of these and also allows 
for a burden to be appurtenant while a benefit is in gross.425  
                                                                                                                 
 
 420. E.g., Riverwood Commercial Park, LLC v. Standard Oil Co., 2011 ND 95 ¶¶ 12–17, 
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The issue of transferring the burden created by the FRAND commitment is 
almost completely resolved if we view the FRAND commitment as creating an 
appurtenant burden and a benefit in gross. Rather than requiring an active 
acceptance on the part of the assignee, as is likely the case under a formal contract 
law approach, an appurtenant burden can be binding on an assignee automatically, 
though the transfer of the burden will require the assignee to be on notice of the 
FRAND commitment. Because a property interest theory would rely on notice for a 
burden to transfer, rather than assent to the agreement as would be required for a 
contract to transfer, a servitude approach could resolve the problem of how to 
ensure that these agreements are binding against new assignees. If an assignee does 
not explicitly consent to the agreement, but has actual or constructive notice that he 
is acquiring an SEP, this property theory could help avoid “innocent purchaser” 
defenses raised by assignees that seek excessive royalties for newly acquired SEPs. 
In other words, provided there is constructive or actual notice, the agreement will 
“run with the patent” and prohibit excessive rent-seeking behaviors by new 
assignees. In the SEP context, notice could likely be inferred when the assignee is a 
participant in the market for products that implement the standard, because such 
standards are typically publicly available. 
The nature of the interest created also gives the property theory an advantage 
over a detrimental reliance theory. With detrimental reliance, the interest is created 
based on the actions of the patent holder and the standard adopter.426 On the other 
hand, when a property interest is properly created, the interest will exist 
independently of the actions and perceptions of the patent holder and standard 
adopter. Thus, the burden for establishing a negotiation right is potentially easier to 
demonstrate with the property theory than it is when applying a detrimental 
reliance theory. 
It is true that a patent is generally not being transferred when a FRAND 
commitment is made. But there is no property transfer when a servitude in real 
property is created either, just the creation of a use privilege.427 An illustration in 
the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes provides a strong justification for 
our analogy to apply in this case. Illustration 2 of section 2.6 explains the current 
law of benefits in gross as follows:  
 As a condition of granting planning approval, the City of X requires 
Developer, the owner of Blackacre, to execute an agreement limiting 
the density of development on Blackacre. The agreement states that the 
burden shall run with Blackacre and the benefit shall be held by the 
City in gross. The agreement creates a servitude burdening Blackacre. 
The City of X holds the benefit in gross.428 
This illustration offers an excellent analogy to the transfer of SEPs subject to 
FRAND commitments. Borrowing the above language, the FRAND commitment 
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problem with SEPs and the corresponding solution from adopting the law of 
servitudes can be described as follows:  
As a condition of [including the patent owner’s patent in the standard 
under development], the [standard-setting organization] requires [the 
owner of Patent X] to execute an agreement limiting [licensing 
agreements to fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms]. The 
agreement states that the burden shall run with [Patent X] and the 
benefit shall be held by [implementers of the standard] in gross. The 
agreement creates a servitude burdening [the owner of Patent X]. The 
[SSO and implementers of the standard] hold[] the benefit in gross. 
The possibility for servitudes to have an appurtenant benefit or a benefit held in 
gross also provides an opportunity for distinguishing between licenses and FRAND 
commitments. With a FRAND commitment, as discussed above, the benefit must 
be characterized as being held in gross. On the other hand, if a patent license also 
creates a servitude, we would characterize that servitude as having an appurtenant 
benefit. The consequence of this characterization may be that the party asserting his 
right to a benefit will more easily be able to prove the entitlement if the benefit is 
appurtenant instead of in gross.  
Generally, FRAND commitments address the issue of the agreement being 
enforceable against successors in interest.429 However, these agreements generally 
do so under the theory that a FRAND commitment is governed solely by formal 
contract law, where consent to be bound will need to be obtained.430 If consent to 
be bound is not obtained, the assignor may have violated the agreement with the 
SSO, but the assignee has committed no wrong and likely cannot be required to 
comply with the commitment. If FRAND commitments can be viewed as creating a 
property interest analogous to interests created under the law of servitudes, this 
could resolve one of the major problems that arises in the context of transferring 
SEPs.  
2. Servitudes and Other FRAND Problems 
Most of the problems relating to FRAND commitments can be resolved through 
contract language, with the exception of the transferability issue. Binding a 
successor in interest to an ordinary contract typically requires the successor’s assent 
to be bound.431 On the other hand, viewing a FRAND commitment as creating a 
servitude resolves this issue by allowing the commitment to run with the patent.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 429. Supra Part I.F.1. 
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A servitude theory of FRAND commitments also has some application to the 
other problems that we have examined in this Article. A servitude by necessity, for 
example, may be created by implication when the absence of such a servitude 
would deprive one party “of rights necessary to reasonable enjoyment of the 
land.”432 The idea of a servitude by necessity thus supports a view that if a FRAND 
commitment creates a servitude, the commitment should at least bind assignees 
when the assigned patent is an SEP. Because servitudes can also be created by 
express agreement, this supports the view that a FRAND commitment should bind 
an assignee when the SSO’s IPR policy requires the commitment to cover essential 
noncore patents or commercially essential patents. 
A servitude theory could also address the issue of whether nonmembers should 
be able to enforce a FRAND commitment. Like formal contract law and the idea of 
intended beneficiaries, some jurisdictions applying the law of servitudes would 
permit the benefit of a servitude to be created in a third party.433 Formal contract 
law, however, does not include the concept of a contract benefit held in gross. The 
idea of a “benefit in gross” assists not only in addressing the transfer issue but also 
in addressing the question of whether FRAND commitments are enforceable by 
nonmembers. If the benefit of a FRAND commitment is understood to be held in 
gross for standard implementers, it will not matter whether the implementer is a 
member of the SSO. Thus, a servitude approach could resolve the member-
nonmember issue. However, this will likely require the SSOs to not include 
limiting language that restricts the FRAND obligation to member licensees. Thus, 
just like the issue of attaching the servitude to noncore essential patents or 
commercially essential patents, the language of the SSO’s IPR policy will govern. 
A servitude theory, however, is less likely to be helpful with the issue of after-
acquired patents. This is because our property theory relies on the idea that the 
servitude attaches at the time of the FRAND commitment. Thus, a contract theory 
analogizing to the law of secured transactions would likely still be necessary to 
address after-acquired patents. 
3. Invalidating Servitudes 
According to the current Restatement, servitudes are valid unless illegal, 
unconstitutional, or contrary to public policy.434 Under the Restatement, a servitude 
may be contrary to public policy if the servitude: (1) is arbitrary, spiteful, or 
capricious; (2) is unreasonably burdensome of a fundamental constitutional right; 
(3) unreasonably restrains alienability; (4) unreasonably restrains trade or 
competition; or (5) is unconscionable.435 A patent owner looking to invalidate a 
servitude created by a FRAND commitment may argue that the agreement imposes 
an unreasonable restraint on alienability, but we expect that this argument would 
fail. The applicable restriction on alienability is addressed in section 3.5 of the 
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Restatement, which says that indirect restraints on alienation do not cause a 
servitude to be invalidated.436 Under the Restatement, an indirect restraint may 
include use limitations, reducing the realizable amount from transferring the 
property, or some other act that reduces the property’s value.437 We would thus 
characterize the restriction on acceptable royalties imposed by a FRAND 
commitment as an indirect restraint on alienation that would not affect the 
servitude’s validity.  
On the other hand, requiring a PAE to be bound by a FRAND-RF agreement 
could arguably be contrary to public policy as a restraint on the trade of this entity 
if licensing patents is its primary source of income. Some of the litigation that 
arises in the FRAND and SEP transfer context involves patents that were obtained 
by PAEs with this sort of business model.438 In these situations, if the agreements 
with the SSO required FRAND-RF agreements, thus depriving the PAE of any 
income from the patent that they likely purchased as part of a patent portfolio, this 
total loss of value might amount to an unreasonable restraint on alienation or an 
unreasonable restraint on trade. However, a PAE that found itself subject to a 
servitude created by a FRAND commitment could still obtain some value from the 
patent in its possession, and thus the servitude would probably be valid. 
4. Adopting a Servitude Doctrine 
Servitudes in real property can be traced back to English common law and the 
seminal case of Tulk v. Moxhay.439 Because servitudes were created by common 
law, legislative intervention would not be necessary to create a legally binding 
servitude approach to FRAND commitments. Such an approach could instead be 
adopted in case law by a court that recognizes the need for FRAND commitments 
to run with the patent. This would be consistent with how servitudes arose in 
property law.  
In fact, there is some evidence that such a step would be a natural progression in 
terms of how courts currently view the transferability of FRAND commitments. 
Consider, for example, the 2008 ruling in Rembrandt v. Harris.440 The ruling is 
unpublished, and was later reversed for reasons unrelated to the court’s initial 
conclusion on this point, but the Delaware court there stated, “[A]ccording to the 
clear and unambiguous terms of the 1995 patent statement issued by Rembrandt's 
predecessor, AT&T, Rembrandt owes Harris a license to the ‘627 patent under 
RAND terms to the extent the patent is ‘essential’ to the implementation of the 
HDTV standard set by the Advanced Television System Committee.”441 The 
“patent statement” in that case is what we have characterized as a FRAND 
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commitment, and under the patent statement, AT&T committed to granting 
nonexclusive licenses authorizing the use of essential patents in exchange for a 
reasonable royalty.442 AT&T later assigned the patent to Rembrandt.443 The court 
noted that Rembrandt had notice of the patent statement and was thus bound by it 
to the extent that the patent in issue was essential.444 There, the court characterized 
Harris’s right to a license as “a creature of contract,” suggesting that the contract 
theory of FRAND commitments is what makes this patent statement binding on 
Rembrandt.445 
But is calling it a “creature of contract” really a fair characterization of what is 
going on here? How often does contract law focus on notice when determining if a 
contract is enforceable against a nonparty? Certainly, as discussed above, there is 
plenty of support for the idea that a nonparty to a contract may be a third-party 
beneficiary who is entitled to enforce the contract in appropriate circumstances.446 
But outside specific exceptions, like binding a principal to a contract that an agent 
entered into on the principal’s behalf,447 a trustee’s assumption of a contract during 
bankruptcy proceedings,448 and using principles of equitable estoppel to prevent a 
party from claiming the benefits of a contract while denying burdens under the 
same contract such as arbitration provisions,449 contract law typically relies on 
mutual assent in order to obligate a party to take on contractual burdens.450 So 
while the patent statement made by AT&T was a contract, and Rembrandt had 
notice of the patent statement, this alone would likely not be enough to obligate 
Rembrandt to license the essential patents on FRAND terms—unless the contract is 
understood as creating an encumbrance that runs with the patent.  
The court in Rembrandt explicitly relied on Rembrandt’s having notice of the 
patent statement in concluding that Rembrandt was bound by the patent 
statement.451 This position is a direct echo of Tulk v. Moxhay, where the court 
asserted that “if an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no one 
purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the 
party from whom he purchased.”452 In the language of Tulk v. Moxhay, the FRAND 
commitment is an instrument by which the patent owner attaches an “equity” to the 
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patent.453 Tulk v. Moxhay involved the creation of an entirely new legal doctrine for 
allowing encumbrances on real property to run with the land, and it is a seminal 
case that the majority of first-year property courses discuss.454 But when the 
Delaware court used very similar language, it was just a “creature of contract.”455 
We believe that the Rembrandt court felt constrained to use contract theory, so 
while the analysis tangentially alluded to a servitude theory of FRAND 
commitments, the court did not take the analysis one step further to explicitly 
recognize the FRAND commitment as creating a property interest.  
Discussion of cases involving patent transfers thus hints at an undercurrent of 
servitude theory, and we argue that there should be formal recognition of the 
property theory that we advance for understanding the nature of the encumbrance 
created by the FRAND commitment. We urge that courts should explicitly 
recognize that the FRAND commitment attaches to the patent, and that the 
obligation to license on FRAND terms will run to subsequent assignees. Once 
courts explicitly recognize these commitments as attaching an encumbrance to the 
patent in a manner analogous to a servitude, the market will respond to the new 
legal certainty. Patent buyers will have an incentive to inquire into the existence of 
FRAND commitments as part of normal due diligence and will price the offer 
accordingly. For example, a patent encumbered by a FRAND commitment will 
likely bring in licensing income. To the purchaser, a FRAND-encumbered patent 
may be worth less than an unencumbered patent that is currently being licensed, but 
more than an unencumbered patent that is not currently being licensed.456 
This new legal certainty is also desirable from a law and economics perspective. 
As Coleman notes in discussing the market paradigm, markets require contracting 
or exchange, and uncertainty threatens exchange.457 Coleman further observes that 
the appropriate application of law can reduce uncertainty and foster market 
cooperation.458 A clear definition of property rights and effective enforcement of 
contractual arrangements are two hallmarks of a robust economy.459 An 
understanding that FRAND commitments run with the patent creates an 
environment where investors are assured that these types of commitments will be 
enforced. Awareness of these carefully circumscribed property rights will then, as 
an ex ante matter, foster investment and support the adoption of the standardized 
technologies. 
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Because of the nature of the FRAND commitment, courts should consider 
principles of both property and contract law when resolving disputes. The effects of 
the commitment should largely be determined by the language of the contract, and 
many of the problems noted in this Article could be resolved by a sufficiently 
detailed IPR policy. But if a patentee could extinguish the benefits of a FRAND 
commitment by transferring the patent to a third party, this would lead to 
inequitable results. Once FRAND commitments are formally recognized as 
creating an encumbrance on patents that “runs with the patent” to subsequent 
assignees, this will add legal certainty to situations where SEPs are assigned. 
Because the modern economy involves the frequent transfer of intellectual 
property, we expect that increased certainty concerning the availability of licenses 
after an assignment will strengthen competition and the standard-setting process.  
However, this new legal certainty will need to be complemented by the certainty 
of license availability, which may be lacking if patent owners are permitted to seek 
injunctions for the infringement of SEPs. Thus, any efforts to improve legal 
certainty in the standards context must also consider the availability of injunctions 
as a remedy for patent infringement, a topic that we turn to next. 
IV. FRAND COMMITMENTS, INJUNCTIONS, AND LIABILITY 
We now turn to the fifth problem in our hypothetical: May a patent owner seek 
an injunction against the use of an SEP by a standard adopter? This analysis is 
typically shaped by the presence of a FRAND commitment; specifically, the extent 
to which a FRAND commitment affects the possibility of an injunction.  
The wide availability of injunctions, formerly a hallmark of patent law, has 
become more restricted over the last seven years since eBay v. MercExchange, 
when the Supreme Court enumerated a four-part test for determining if a permanent 
injunction is appropriate in cases involving patent infringement.460 The narrowing 
of the injunction standard is likely to be especially relevant when patent litigation 
concerns SEPs. In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Motorola sought an injunction 
against Apple for infringement of the ‘898 patent.461 Judge Posner, sitting by 
designation, concluded that by making the FRAND commitment, Motorola 
“implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to 
use that patent.”462 The theoretical basis for this approach is examined in more 
detail in Part IV.B. below.  
Before eBay v. MercExchange, injunctions were frequently sought and obtained 
when a patent was found to be infringed.463 The standard of the Federal Circuit 
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required defendants to establish that an injunction would be too harmful,464 rather 
than the current legal test where the plaintiff is required to establish that an 
injunction would not be too harmful.465 Injunction-seeking behavior was often 
motivated by the added leverage that an injunction gave its holder.466 For example, 
when NTP, Inc., a PAE, sued Research In Motion (RIM) for patent infringement, a 
jury initially awarded NTP $23 million in damages in November 2002.467 The 
damages award was followed by an injunction, which was stayed pending appeal, 
and was then vacated by the Federal Circuit.468 In February 2006, the litigation was 
still ongoing. The district court judge, impatient with the parties’ failure to 
negotiate, suggested that he was considering granting an injunction that would 
prohibit the U.S. sale of RIM’s Blackberry line of products.469 Settlement 
negotiations quickly concluded, with RIM agreeing to pay NTP $612.5 million in a 
full and final settlement with no provisions that might have required NTP to return 
the funds if the USPTO later invalidated the patents in issue.470 The threat of 
another injunction effectively turned a $23 million jury verdict into a $612 million 
payout. 
A. Injunctions After eBay v. MercExchange 
The patentee’s right to exclude has long figured importantly in the issue of 
injunctions in patent litigation.471 In May 2006, the Supreme Court decided eBay v. 
MercExchange, replacing the Federal Circuit’s injunction-friendly approach with a 
four-factor test for injunctions.472 Under eBay, a party seeking an injunction must 
show that irreparable injury has occurred, that money damages would be 
inadequate, that the balance of the hardships favors an equitable remedy, and that a 
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permanent injunction would not be harmful to the public interest.473 This has 
generally made it more difficult to obtain an injunction in patent litigation, with 
courts increasingly awarding ongoing royalties instead.474 Ongoing royalties are 
similar to compulsory licenses, except an ongoing royalty only applies to a 
particular set of defendants.475 Thus, a prevailing patentee might seek money 
damages for past infringement and ongoing royalties for future infringement but is 
less likely to successfully obtain an injunction post-eBay.476 According to research 
by Chien and Lemley, before eBay, approximately 95% of requests for injunctions 
in patent cases were granted, but after eBay, this number was down to about 
75%.477 
In the context of standards, it is likely that the four factors of eBay will weigh 
against an injunction, especially when a FRAND commitment exists.478 When the 
Ninth Circuit decided an interlocutory appeal in Microsoft v. Motorola, the court 
noted in dicta that injunctive relief “is arguably a remedy inconsistent with the 
licensing commitment.”479 While the Ninth Circuit did not state its position on this 
matter as a legal conclusion, its choice of wording did provide some hints as to the 
court’s position. In addition to noting that an injunction was “arguably” 
inconsistent with a FRAND commitment, the Ninth Circuit also noted that “it could 
well be” that the only remedy that a patent owner could seek consistent with 
FRAND commitments made to ITU would be for the court to set a reasonable 
royalty rate and have it apply retrospectively.480 In Realtek v. LSI, the district court 
relied on Microsoft v. Motorola in granting a preliminary injunction against the 
enforcement of an ITC exclusion order.481 Thus, if a patent owner sues a standard 
adopter for infringement, trends in case law in the United States suggest that a court 
that finds infringement might limit remedies to reasonable royalties, reasoning that 
injunctions are an inappropriate means of redress when the patent in issue is an 
SEP. A court that does so and orders payment of past royalties at a reasonable rate, 
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to be determined by the court, would effectively be enforcing the FRAND 
commitment by refusing the patent owner the option of denying a license. 
In his concurring opinion in eBay, Justice Kennedy suggested that it might be 
inappropriate to grant injunctions “[w]hen the patented invention is but a small 
component of the product,”482 a condition that will almost certainly be met in the 
context of standards that read on dozens of individual patents. However, Merges 
and Kuhn question whether merely making it more difficult to obtain an injunction 
provides sufficient protection for good faith adopters of open standards, suggesting 
that it would be beneficial to address the public interest factor relating to standards 
earlier in litigation than eBay permits.483 But addressing the issue earlier in 
litigation will only benefit good faith adopters of standards if there is not an 
alternative to Article III courts that still provides a viable possibility of injunctions. 
As we discuss in Part IV.C, the ITC offers just such an alternative. 
Injunctions in the FRAND context are arguably very different from injunctions 
in typical patent litigation. Thus, we now turn to a theoretical analysis of the effect 
that FRAND commitments have on the entitlements held by the patent owner and 
prospective licensee. 
B. Property Rules and Liability Rules 
When the interests of two or more groups conflict, the government must 
generally decide which interest should be protected. As Calabresi and Melamed 
assert in their foundational article, entitlements may generally be protected by 
either property rules or liability rules.484 An injunction is an example of an 
entitlement protection under a property rule.485 In this framework, property rules 
are generally understood as conferring a right to exclude, whereas liability rules 
confer a right to be paid.486  
By analogizing to criminal sanctions, Calabresi and Melamed suggest that 
applying property rules can deter actions that society views as harmful in a way 
that liability rules would not.487 If a thief is caught and a liability rule is applied to 
only require the thief to compensate the victim for the value of the stolen item, this 
would convert all property rules into liability rules488 in a regime where anyone 
could claim any property as long as he paid for it after the taking. Property rules 
may also be more efficient than liability rules when the lowest cost avoider is 
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known.489 If a potential thief knows that he wants a specific item, he can attempt to 
negotiate with the rightful owner instead of stealing it, because the potential thief is 
the lowest cost avoider. But if an item is damaged or destroyed in an accident, a 
liability rule to compensate the owner would be appropriate. In that case, a property 
rule would be inefficient, because that would require parties to negotiate value 
before an unforeseen accident.490  
While the certainty of liability rules may be desirable in the case of patents, 
Calabresi and Melamed’s analogy to criminal sanctions may be instructive. Though 
injunctions in patent cases may be harmful, it may be in the best interests of society 
to preserve injunctions in egregious cases of willful infringement. It may also be 
socially desirable to preserve the availability of injunctions in the standards context 
in very limited circumstances, such as when the implementer of the standard 
refuses anything less than a royalty-free licensing arrangement.491 
Some argue that in the context of IP, property remedies like injunctions or 
exclusive rights may promote settlements and efficiency,492 though Menell warns 
that such remedies may also lead to inefficiencies and holdout under some 
circumstances.493 If Menell is correct, it follows that there are some situations 
where converting the property rule into a liability rule would be appropriate. Lee 
goes so far as to suggest that when an innovator improves on a patent, the situation 
should be analogized to accession in the property context, with ongoing royalties 
being favored over injunctions.494 However, Lee’s approach may be too broad and 
thus remove the incentive for competitors to innovate around blocking patents. In 
our view, the standards context would likely fit Menell’s characterization of 
circumstances where exclusivity may be undesirable. The potential harm to 
consumers in the form of increased prices and enforced injunctions persuades us to 
argue against injunctions as a general rule, especially in the context of standards. 
This conclusion is also supported by Reichman’s reasoning in his widely cited 
article on liability rules in hybrid intellectual property systems, where Reichman 
urged that a liability rule would be more appropriate than an exclusionary property 
rule in the context of technical standards.495 
At its core, the current discussion about injunctions demands that we determine 
how to allocate liability and entitlement. Burk’s analysis of property and liability 
rules in the intellectual property context examines four possible allocative rules,496 
which we summarize in the table below: 
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Table 1. Possible Property Allocative Rules 
 
 





Owner needs exclusivity. 
 
Injunction against infringer. 
Damages are adequate. 
 








No infringement, or 
infringer is prior user. 
 







Owner may pay damages to 
non-owner, non-owner will 
halt the use. 
 
 
In some types of patent litigation, where the patent owner practices the patent 
and needs exclusivity, protection by a property rule in the form of an injunction 
may be appropriate. Injunctions arguably encourage innovation by requiring 
competitors to work around blocking patents, and therefore in some situations, the 
possibility of injunctions can benefit both patent owners and the market in general. 
However, in the standards context, we argue that a patent owner who has made a 
FRAND commitment has essentially stated that, as to their SEPs, damages will be 
adequate. This type of reasoning can also be found in multiple recent cases 
concerning FRAND commitments.497 Thus, by making the FRAND commitment, 
the SEP owner has waived a claim to using a property rule to preserve exclusivity. 
The FRAND commitment can thus be said to have converted the property rule into 
a liability rule, under which the patent owner would be entitled to money damages, 
but not an injunction, when the owner asserts his rights in the patent.  
The lower right cell’s “reverse liability” rule may be illustrated by property 
cases about moving to the nuisance, especially as depicted in Spur Industries, Inc. 
v. Del E. Webb Development Co.498 In such a case, the party that causes the 
nuisance is entitled to payment from the injured party for the cost of abating the 
nuisance.499 Burk suggests that a reverse liability approach could potentially apply 
in the standards context if a court focused on a breach of the FRAND commitment 
as the injury instead of focusing on patent infringement.500 If a court found both 
that a FRAND commitment was breached and a patent was infringed, then instead 
of requiring the infringer to pay ongoing royalties, the court might choose to 
require the patent owner to compensate the infringer for the cost of adopting a non-
infringing alternative. In normal patent infringement cases, we do not think this 
option would be appropriate, since it requires the patent owner to pay for the right 
to exclude after having already paid to develop the technology and obtain the 
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patent. However, Burk suggests that a reverse liability rule may provide a deterrent 
effect for abusive use of an SEP in the case of standards.501  
While it may sound good in theory, a reverse liability rule would likely not work 
in practice, even in the context of standards. If the patent owner were required to 
pay the infringer for the cost of designing around the patent, this would be very 
impracticable on several levels. First, such a design around may not even be 
feasible. Second, such a payment may effectively amount to the SEP owner paying 
off a competitor to exit the market for the standardized good, which may raise 
antitrust concerns. Third, the payment is likely to be so high that no reasonable SEP 
owner would be interested. Thus, a reverse liability theory would likely not have 
any lasting impact in the context of SEPs, and the effect of a FRAND commitment 
would be limited to converting the property rule into a liability rule. 
Even if FRAND commitments are understood as converting a property rule 
favoring injunctions into a liability rule where only damages may be sought, this 
conversion would likely only occur in traditional court settings. We turn now to the 
existence of different kind of injunction that remains available to patent holders—
the exclusion order.  
C. ITC Exclusion Orders 
In eBay, the Supreme Court overruled the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that 
permanent injunctions should issue in patent cases unless there were “unusual 
circumstances” such that denial of an injunction was necessary to protect the public 
interest.502 However, this general rule still survives elsewhere in patent-related 
litigation: the ITC. The ITC is not discussed as often in patent literature as litigation 
before Article III courts, but Chien and Lemley provide a detailed analysis of patent 
disputes before the ITC in their 2012 article.503 
The ITC allows patent owners to seek exclusion orders under section 1337 of 
title 19.504 According to the Federal Circuit, as a non-Article III court, the ITC is 
not bound by the equitable test of eBay.505 Under section 1337, if the ITC 
determines that the section has been violated, the articles concerned shall “be 
excluded from entry into the United States,” unless an exception applies.506 Thus, 
the burden is inverted. In Article III courts, eBay puts the burden on the patentee to 
establish that an injunction would not violate the four factors,507 whereas in cases 
before the ITC, the infringer carries the burden of establishing that an exclusion 
order would be too harmful.508  
The ITC’s standard resembles the pre-eBay standard of the Federal Circuit, 
which required a showing of exceptional circumstances to support not granting an 
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injunction.509 Adequacy of money damages is not considered by the ITC, likely in 
part because the ITC cannot award damages.510 The presence of irreparable injury 
and the balance of the hardships between the patent owner and the infringer are also 
not factors before the ITC, which instead focuses on several categories of harm that 
we would characterize as public interest harms: (1) public health and welfare; (2) 
competitive conditions across the whole U.S. economy; (3) the existence of 
competitive articles produced in the United States; and (4) the effect on U.S. 
consumers.511 However, the ITC has only rarely found that public interest factors 
weigh against an exclusion order, and in these cases, the products in issue were 
necessary for a purpose related to health and welfare, and there was no other 
supplier who could meet the demand in a reasonable time period.512 Chien and 
Lemley found that in the ITC relatively little emphasis has been placed on 
competitive conditions or harm to consumers as factors that might weigh against an 
exclusion order.513 Thus, while the presence of patents in standards might weigh 
against granting an exclusion order, the ITC’s current lack of emphasis on these 
two factors may make it more difficult to avoid an exclusion order, even in the 
standards context.514 
Thus, while eBay seemingly offers some protection against injunctions for 
adopters of a standard when the litigation is in an Article III court, the ITC 
continues to grant exclusion orders as its sole statutorily authorized method of 
indicating that a patent owner’s exclusive rights have been violated.515 The ITC’s 
approach to patents in the standards context should be revised. We are in favor of 
the approach promoted by the DOJ and USPTO in a letter to the ITC dated January 
8, 2013, wherein the two agencies make a joint recommendation that exclusion 
orders should not be granted in the case of SEPs unless the putative licensee has 
refused to pay any royalties.516  
An alternative solution is for Article III courts to grant injunctions against the 
enforcement of exclusion orders entered due to the alleged infringement of SEPs. 
This approach was recently taken by Judge Whyte in the Northern District of 
California in Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp.517 In Realtek, Judge Whyte 
relied on Microsoft v. Motorola to conclude that LSI’s failure to offer a license on 
FRAND terms prior to seeking an exclusion order from the ITC violated LSI’s 
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obligations to IEEE pursuant to its FRAND commitments.518 Accordingly, Judge 
Whyte granted Realtek’s request for a preliminary injunction against enforcement 
of the ITC exclusion order, pending resolution of a trial to determine the proper 
FRAND royalty rate.519 
The structure of section 1337 also permits the President to disapprove an 
exclusion order within sixty days of issuance.520 The use of this power is very rare, 
but in August 2013, the Obama administration disapproved an ITC exclusion order 
that would have permitted Samsung to keep several Apple devices from being 
imported into the United States.521 In the letter, U.S. Trade Representative Michael 
Froman emphasized that public policy considerations weighed against an exclusion 
order in this instance, where the infringed patents in issue were SEPs that were 
subject to FRAND commitments.522 
In our view, neither injunctions nor exclusion orders should be available to 
patentees bound by a FRAND commitment unless extreme circumstances exist. For 
example, if the adopter refuses to pay royalties at any price, this type of behavior 
may justify an injunction. Beyond that sort of narrow circumstance, however, the 
FRAND commitment should be understood as converting the property rule into a 
liability rule, since by making the commitment, the patentee has freely 
acknowledged that royalties would provide adequate compensation for the loss of 
exclusivity. We argue that a general prohibition on injunctive relief when a 
FRAND commitment exists would be consistent with well-established approaches 
to property and liability rules, and is a logical progression following the Supreme 
Court’s recent narrowing of injunction policy in patent litigation.  
CONCLUSION 
Information is like currency. Some sources indicate that over 50% of the 
business output of industry in the United States is comprised of intangible assets, 
many of which are protected by intellectual property rights.523 Companies are often 
bought and sold based on the value of their IP portfolios, especially patents.524 
These patent transfers have significant implications for technology-reliant 
industries like ICT industries. These industries often utilize standards to facilitate 
interoperability, with SSOs often requiring owners of essential patents to commit to 
licensing these patents on FRAND terms to future licensees.  
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Numerous court decisions demonstrate the types of problems regarding FRAND 
commitments that we have delineated in this Article. But despite these problems, 
the theoretical foundations that might help us understand the nature and scope of 
the FRAND commitment have not been studied. In this Article, we examined these 
theoretical foundations and exposed the limitations of theories grounded in patent, 
antitrust, and contract in terms of enabling the analysis of issues and problems 
concerning the FRAND commitment. We noted that a contract-based theory offers 
a good approach in many situations, but we also exposed the significant limitations 
of contract theory as applied to FRAND commitments. In particular, contract 
theory fails to effectively address the problem of enforcing FRAND commitments 
after an SEP has been transferred. 
In this Article, we posited for the first time that understanding a FRAND 
commitment through the lens of property would be an effective approach to support 
the public interest in favor of having a FRAND commitment run with the patent. 
We also concluded that such an approach would be consistent with U.S. law 
concerning servitudes, and that this theoretical approach could resolve one of the 
major problems that arises when SEPs are transferred. By applying the classic 
theories of Hohfeld and those of modern scholars like Merrill and Smith, we 
established that a FRAND commitment creates a hybrid type of right that cannot be 
understood purely through the lens of contract law. This approach then allowed us 
to conceptualize the FRAND commitment as an encumbrance that runs with the 
patent, similar to a servitude under real property law. 
Finally, we examined the use of injunctions in patent litigation, and in FRAND 
disputes in particular, and discussed the availability of injunctions in non-
traditional forums like the ITC. Through application of theoretical insights 
concerning property rules and liability rules, we established why a FRAND 
commitment should be understood as a waiver of the right to seek an injunction for 
infringement of an SEP. By applying the FRAND commitment theories espoused 
in this Article to prohibit injunctions for infringement of SEPs and to protect the 
transferability of FRAND commitments, courts and SSOs can ensure the continued 
viability of a competitive marketplace for ideas and innovation. 
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